8 ideas
| 3986 | The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: The 'intentional stance' is the tactic of interpreting an entity by adopting the presupposition that it is an approximation of the ideal of an optimally designed (i.e. rational) self-regarding agent. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239) | |
| A reaction: This is Dennett's 'instrumentalism', a descendant of behaviourism, which strikes me as a pragmatist's evasion of the ontological problems of mind which should interest philosophers |
| 3987 | Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: Like such abstracta as centres of gravity and parallelograms of force, the beliefs and desires posited by the highest intentional stance have no independent and concrete existence. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239) | |
| A reaction: I don't see why we shouldn't one day have a physical account of the distinctive brain events involved in a belief or a desire |
| 3984 | The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: All attributions of content are founded on an appreciation of the functional roles of the items in question. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239) | |
| A reaction: This seems wrong to me. How can anything's nature be its function? It must have intrinsic characteristics in order to have the function. This is an evasion. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 20977 | Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham] |
| Full Idea: Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense — nonsense upon stilts. | |
| From: Jeremy Bentham (Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights [1796]) | |
| A reaction: If you want your opinion to be remembered, express it memorably! I take natural rights to be the basic principles and values which are obvious to almost everyone when they come for formulate legal rights (which are the only true rights). |
| 21003 | Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham] |
| Full Idea: Right, the substantive right, is the child of law; from real laws come real rights; but from imaginary laws, from 'law of nature' can come only imaginary rights. | |
| From: Jeremy Bentham (Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights [1796], II.523), quoted by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 17 'Ethics' | |
| A reaction: I am coming to agree with this. What are called 'natural rights' are just self-evident good reasons why someone should be allowed a right. A right can, of course, come from an informal agreement. The question is: why award that particular legal right? |
| 3983 | Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: Learning is evolution in the brain. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.238) | |
| A reaction: This is a rather non-conscious, associationist view, connected to Dawkins' idea of 'memes'. It seems at least partially correct. |
| 3985 | Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: Biology is not a science like physics, in which one should strive to find 'laws of nature', but a species of engineering. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239) | |
| A reaction: Yes. This is also true of chemistry, which has always struck me as minitiarised car mechanics. |