13 ideas
22701 | Jokes can sometimes be funny because they are offensive [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: Sometimes it is exactly what is offensive about a joke that makes it funny. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'emotional') | |
A reaction: Jacobson offers this in support of his immoralist view, that immoral literature can be aesthetically successful. It is uncomfortable to find yourself laughing at a joke of which you disapprove. |
13952 | Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R] |
Full Idea: Essentialism, as I shall understand it, is the doctrine that among the attributes of a thing some are essential, others merely accidental. Its essential attributes are those it has necessarily, those it could not have lacked. | |
From: Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.149) | |
A reaction: The problem with this, which Cartwright does not address, is that trivial and gerrymandered properties (such as having self-identity, or being 'such that 2+2=4') seem to be necessarily, but don't seem to constitute the essence of a thing. |
13954 | The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R] |
Full Idea: I see no reason for thinking essentialism unintelligible, but a chief perplexity is the obscurity of the grounds on which ratings of attributes as essential or accidental are to be made. | |
From: Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.158) | |
A reaction: In that case some of us younger philosophers will have to roll up our sleeves and tease out the grounds for essentialism, starting with Aristotle and Leibniz, and ending with the successes of modern science. |
13955 | Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R] |
Full Idea: Apparently those who think essentialism unintelligible see support for their position in the doctrine that necessary truths are all analytic. Only relative to some mode of designation does it make sense to speak of an object as necessarily this or that. | |
From: Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.158) | |
A reaction: He has in mind Quine and his mathematician-cyclist (Idea 8482). Personally I have no problems with the example. No one is essentially a cyclist - that isn't what essence is. Two-legged people can be cyclists. |
13953 | An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R] |
Full Idea: For an ostension to be successful it is surely not necessary that I gather what sort of object it is you have indicated, such as being a horse or a zebra. I may even gather which thing you have indicated without knowing that it is a mammal or even alive. | |
From: Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.157) | |
A reaction: This nicely articulates the objection I have always felt to Geach's relative identity. 'Oh my God, what the hell is THAT???' is probably going to be a successful act of verbal reference, even while explicitly denying all knowledge of sortals. |
22703 | We don't often respond to events in art as if they were real events [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: We routinely do not respond to art as if we were as if we were real-life spectators of its events. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'rejection') | |
A reaction: This strikes me as one of the basic facts about aesthetics, and especially of narrative art. People sometimes encounter terrible events on the street, only to find someone is making a film. |
22702 | Audiences can be too moral [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: An audience can be overly moralistic. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'emotional') | |
A reaction: People can be too moral in real life as well. Goody Two Shoes. |
22696 | 'Autonomism' says the morality is irrelevant to the aesthetics [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: 'Autonomism' is the theory that the intrinsic moral merits and defects of an artwork are irrelevant to its aesthetic value. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: This contrasts with 'moralism', which says the ethics is part of the aesthetics. Autonomism seems to be the modern academic label for art for art's sake. In nineteenth century novels the ethics are central; in modernist novels they seem to be irrelevant. |
22697 | Moral defects of art can be among its aesthetic virtues [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: To put my claim most provocatively: the moral defects in a work of art can be among its aesthetic virtues. This claim has been called 'immoralism'. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: To describe sympathetic descriptions of vile moral behaviour as 'defects' may be a misunderstanding. If a work sets out to promote wickedness, then its wickedness isn't a defect in the work. It could be a masterpiece of corruption. |
22700 | Immoral art encourages immoral emotions [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: Humean moralism includes the view that immoral art prescribes unethical emotional responses. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'emotional') | |
A reaction: [He cites Hume's 'On the Standard of Taste'] 'Prescribes' is tricky. Is a vivid description of wicked events, given without comment, a prescription? What if the commentary condemns, but the description entices? Trust the work itself, said Lawrence. |
22699 | Moderate moralism says moral qualities can sometimes also be aesthetic qualities [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: Noël Carroll's moderate moralism maintains that some moral defects in artworks are aesthetic defects, and some moral virtues are aesthetic merits. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'How moderate') | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think that moralist critics are confusing morality and wisdom. We don't admire novels for hammering on about goodness. We admire their insight into characters and actions, of which the most interesting aspects happen to be moral. |
22698 | We can judge art ethically, or rate its ethical influence, or assess its quality via its ethics [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: Ethical criticism includes 1) ethical judgements of art works, 2) assessment of an art work's role in moral education, or 3) bringing moral praise or censure to bear on the aesthetic evaluation. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'What is') | |
A reaction: [a compressed summary of Jacobson. He cites Levinson 1998 and Carroll 2000 as examples of ethical criticism] |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |