8 ideas
| 17423 | The essence of natural numbers must reflect all the functions they perform [Sicha] |
| Full Idea: What is really essential to being a natural number is what is common to the natural numbers in all the functions they perform. | |
| From: Jeffrey H. Sicha (Counting and the Natural Numbers [1968], 2) | |
| A reaction: I could try using natural numbers as insults. 'You despicable seven!' 'How dare you!' I actually agree. The question about functions is always 'what is it about this thing that enables it to perform this function'. |
| 17425 | To know how many, you need a numerical quantifier, as well as equinumerosity [Sicha] |
| Full Idea: A knowledge of 'how many' cannot be inferred from the equinumerosity of two collections; a numerical quantifier statement is needed. | |
| From: Jeffrey H. Sicha (Counting and the Natural Numbers [1968], 3) |
| 17424 | Counting puts an initial segment of a serial ordering 1-1 with some other entities [Sicha] |
| Full Idea: Counting is the activity of putting an initial segment of a serially ordered string in 1-1 correspondence with some other collection of entities. | |
| From: Jeffrey H. Sicha (Counting and the Natural Numbers [1968], 2) |
| 19722 | We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag] |
| Full Idea: While one might understand the proposition entailed by one's evidence, one might have no idea how or why one's evidence entails it. This seems to imply one is not justified in believing the proposition on the basis of one's evidence. | |
| From: Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Evidential') | |
| A reaction: An example might be seen if a layman tours a physics lab. This looks like a serious problem for evidentialism. Once you see why the evidence entails the proposition, you are getting closer to understanding than to knowledge. Explanation. |
| 19723 | Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag] |
| Full Idea: If one came to believe p with good evidence, but has since forgotten that evidence, we might think one can continue to believe justifiably, but evidentialism appears unable to account for this. | |
| From: Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Forgotten') | |
| A reaction: We would still think that the evidence was important, and we would need to trust the knower's claim that the forgotten evidence was good. So it doesn't seem to destroy the evidentialist thesis. |
| 19720 | Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag] |
| Full Idea: Evidentialism is not a theory about when one's believing is justified; it is a theory about what makes one justified in believing a proposition. It is a thesis regarding 'propositional justification', not 'doxastic justification'. | |
| From: Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Preliminary') | |
| A reaction: Thus it is entirely about whether the evidence supports the proposition, and has no interest in who believes it or why. Knowledge is when you believe a true proposition which has good support. This could be internalist or externalist? |
| 19721 | Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag] |
| Full Idea: Traditional coherence theories seem unable to account for the role experience plays in justification. | |
| From: Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Evidence') | |
| A reaction: I'm inclined to say that experience only becomes a justification when it has taken propositional (though not necessarily lingistic) form. That is, when you see it 'as' something. Uninterpreted shape and colour can justify virtually nothing. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |