17 ideas
| 7096 | We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman] |
| Full Idea: If we focus on the evaluation of character traits, voluntariness becomes less important. We would not withdraw our admiration for a person only because we found out that his or her being such a person was not a result of voluntary choice. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3) | |
| A reaction: The need for voluntariness does not disappear. I would not admire the only generous deed you had ever performed if it was the result of hypnotism. I might admire the hypnotist. Nevertheless, I regard this idea as a crucial truth in moral theory. |
| 22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
| Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a morally relevant distinction between what we do and what we allow to happen. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88) | |
| A reaction: She says many deny this distinction, but she defends it. Presumably consequentialists deny the distinction. What is bad if I do it, but OK if I allow it to happen? Neglecting a victim to save others, she suggests. |
| 22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
| Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a moral distinction between what we aim at and what we foresee as a result of what we do. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88) | |
| A reaction: Cf. Idea 22465. This seems to be the classic doctrine of double effect. It is hard to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we aim at. A wide assessment of consequences is a moral duty. Well-meaning fools are bad. |
| 22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
| Full Idea: The difference between acts and omissions is irrelevant to any moral issue except in so far as it corresponds to the distinction between allowing something to happen and being the agent to whom the happening can be ascribed. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.89) | |
| A reaction: The list of anyone's omissions is presumably infinite, but what they 'allow' must be in some way within their power. But what of something I can't now prevent, only because I failed to do some relevant task yesterday? |
| 7098 | There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman] |
| Full Idea: Since the 1980s, ethics has witnessed a new sort of moral scepticism, this time about the possibility of moral theories. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §4) | |
| A reaction: He cites McDowell, Williams, Nussbaum and Baier as the culprits. 'Particularism' (every situation is different, so there can't be rules) seems an essential part of virtue theory, but total absence of principles sounds to me like moral drift. |
| 7099 | With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman] |
| Full Idea: In a rich conception of human flourishing, both individuals and societies seem to be able to flourish without the virtues. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5) | |
| A reaction: I can see Aristotle clutching his head in despair at this thought. It might look like flourishing, but it couldn't be the real thing. It is Aristotle's fault, though, for including external goods. Money and pleasure offer a kind of flourishing. |
| 22470 | A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot] |
| Full Idea: It has been suggested that one criterion for a good moral system is that it should be possible to demand reciprocity from every individual because of the good the system renders to him. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.104) | |
| A reaction: Money seems to have this feature, that we mostly conform to the rules for its use, because we value the whole system. Foot accepts this, but says there are also other criteria, such as leaving freedom to live well (ie. not too puritanical). |
| 7100 | Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman] |
| Full Idea: It can be claimed that universality is a necessary property of any ethical theory and therefore virtue theory, which fails in this respect, is not a theory, and hence poses no alternative to genuine ethical theories. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5) | |
| A reaction: Replies: a) totally universal morality is an idle dream (part of the 'Enlightenment Project' to prove everything) and we must settle for something more relative; b) virtues aren't totally universal, but they are truths about humanity. I prefer b). |
| 7102 | Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman] |
| Full Idea: That duties are created irrespective of facts about character is obvious from the case of promises, which bind their makers irrespective of their motives or personality. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5) | |
| A reaction: Just occasionally a promise can be broken, by a sensitive and wise person. I promise to give your son some money; I then discover he is a drug dealer. Promises arise out of character, and cannot be made by robots. |
| 22468 | Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Some virtues do give us aims, but nothing from within morality suggests the kind of good state of affairs which it would seem always to be our duty to promote. And why indeed should there be any such thing? | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101) | |
| A reaction: Isn't successful human functioning, such as heath, always to be desired? If honour is a worthy aim, doesn't that make being rightly honoured a desirable state of affairs? She is attacking consequentialism, but I'm not convinced here. |
| 7095 | Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman] |
| Full Idea: According to virtue theory, education through moral exemplars is more effective than education focused on principles and obligations, because it is far more concrete. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle's view is that virtues must be developed from childhood, when principles don't mean much. The problem is that young people may witness highly virtuous behaviour in their exemplars, but totally fail to appreciate it without mention of principles. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 22469 | Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Virtues such as justice consist mainly in adherence to rules of conduct, while those such as benevolence we might call virtues of attachment. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101) | |
| A reaction: Not sure about 'attachment'. We should be benevolent towards people to whom we are not particularly attached. Courage doesn't fall into either group. |
| 7094 | Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman] |
| Full Idea: Being a good friend means acting in ways that express the friendship even when those ways do not promote overall utility. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3) | |
| A reaction: This implies that friendship is a true virtue of character, rather than having friends just being an 'external' good. Having friends is good; being friends is a virtue. There are duties of friendship. |
| 7093 | Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman] |
| Full Idea: It is surely possible, and indeed often the case, that people who violate no duty nevertheless behave in an inhumane and a disgusting manner. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §1) | |
| A reaction: This seems right, though it is easier to be disgusting than to be inhumane if no duty is to be violated. Social duties may not require a high degree of humanity, pure Kantian duties might. |
| 7104 | The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman] |
| Full Idea: The advantage of modern thinkers over the ancient virtue ethicists is that in addition to imperfect duties (i.e. virtues) they also recognise the existence of perfect duties, or duties of justice, which are essential for the existence of society. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §7) | |
| A reaction: Even the Greeks had laws (e.g. Idea 422), so they understood that a society needs rules, but many laws don't seem to be moral rules (e.g. car parking), and the Greeks thought morality was about human excellence, not avoiding traffic jams. |
| 7103 | Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman] |
| Full Idea: Most of the debate on abortion focuses on two issues, the mother's assumed right over her body, and the status of the foetus. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §6) | |
| A reaction: Personally I think society as a whole might have a say (if, perhaps, we are over- or under-populated, or we have a widely accepted state religion, or we are just very shocked). Mother's have virtues and duties as well as rights. |