Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?' and 'Semantics for Propositional Attitudes'

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5 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
15785 Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka]
     Full Idea: We must distinguish between what we are committed to existing in the actual world or a possible world ('ontology'), and what we are committed to as a part of our ways of dealing with the world conceptually, as a part of our conceptual system ('ideology').
     From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02
     A reaction: I think this is the most illuminating idea I have read on the subject of ontological commitment. I'm fighting for the idea that what we think is true should be kept separate from what we think exists. Ideology is a nice addition to the mix.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16473 Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Chalmers' 'modal rationalist' is one who identifies what is possible with what is conceivable; the central claim of the doctrine is that we have a priori access to modal truth.
     From: report of David J.Chalmers (Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? [2002]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 5
     A reaction: A helpful clarification, as I can now see how hopelessly and utterly wrong Chalmers is (about almost everything), and I find my confidence in any sort of genuine a priori knowledge (except of conceptual relations) dwindling by the minute.
19258 Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya]
     Full Idea: For Chalmers, that water is XYZ is 'primary possible' (a priori, or conceptually), because it is true in some world considered as actual. It is 'secondary impossible', when it is evaluated from the Earth as actual.
     From: report of David J.Chalmers (Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? [2002]) by Anand Vaidya - Understanding and Essence Intro
     A reaction: [compressed] This is Chalmers' account of how we can know possibility from conceivability, via his two-dimensional semantics (see alphabetical themes).
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15786 Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka]
     Full Idea: Quantification over members of one particular world is a measure of ideology, quantification that crosses possible worlds is often a measure of ideology.
     From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02
     A reaction: I like this. See Idea 15785 for the underlying distinction. It leaves the question open of what we might mean by 'ideological commitment'.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').