Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics' and 'Aristotle on Substance'

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6 ideas

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth

14713	Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers]
	Full Idea: The epistemic 1-intension for a sentence S is True at a scenario W iff (W and not-S) is a priori incoherent.
	From: David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.180-4), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics
	A reaction: See Two-Dimensional Semantics (in 'Language') and Chalmers for the background to this idea. I love the coherence view of justification, but get a bit nervous when people start defining truth in that way.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object

16083	Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML]
	Full Idea: On the interpretation of Aristotelian matter that I shall propose, matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity, and hence the substantiality, of the object to which it contributes.
	From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], Intro)
	A reaction: Presumably the thought is that if an object is form+matter (hylomorphism), then forms are essentially unified, but matter is essentially unified and sloppy.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

14712	A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers]
	Full Idea: The Core Thesis for rationalist 2D semantics is that for any sentence S, S is apriori iff S has a necessary 1-intension. (That is, there is no possible way the world might be that, if it actually obtained, would make S false).
	From: David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.165), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 2.3.2
	A reaction: [The parenthesis is by Schroeter] A '1-intension' is defined by a diagonal on a 2D semantic matrix. Chalmers defends conceivability as the guide to possibility. This is a very traditional view of the a priori, expressed in modern terms.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter

17006	Prime matter has no place in Aristotle's theories, and passages claiming it are misread [Gill,ML]
	Full Idea: I argue that prime matter has no place in Aristotle's elemental theory. ..References to prime matter are found in Aristotle's work because his theory was thought to need the doctrine. If I am right, these passages will all admit of another interpretation.
	From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], App)
	A reaction: If correct, this strikes me as important for the history of ideas, because scholastics got themselves in a right tangle over prime matter. See Pasnau on it. It pushed the 17th century into corpuscularianism.

16093	Prime matter is actually nothing and potentially everything (or potentially an element) [Gill,ML]
	Full Idea: Prime matter is supposed to be actually nothing and potentially everything or, at any rate, potentially the simplest bodies - earth, water, air and fire.
	From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], Ch.1)
	A reaction: The view that the four elements turn out to be prime matter is distinctive of Gill's approach. Prime matter sounds like quark soup in the early universe.