Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest' and 'Course of Positive Philosophy'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism

7491	The phases of human thought are theological, then metaphysical, then positivist [Comte, by Watson]
	Full Idea: The first phase of humanity was theological, attributing phenomena to a deity, the second metaphysical stage attributed them to abstract forms, the third positive stage abandons ultimate causes and just searches for regularities.
	From: report of Auguste Comte (Course of Positive Philosophy [1846]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.32
	A reaction: This is obviously a highly empirical programme, which reasserts Hume's view of the laws of nature. Effectively, positivism just is the rejection of metaphysics.

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

15453	The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The leading rivals to a theory of universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory.
	From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.110)
	A reaction: If that is the complete menu, I choose resemblance nominalism. All discussion of properties in terms of classes is wildly misguided (because properties come first). Why not 'natural' tropes?

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object

15452	We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
	Full Idea: We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same.
	From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109)
	A reaction: This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').