Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Survival and Identity, with postscript' and 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier'

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4 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality

16079	De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Lewis, by Rudder Baker]
	Full Idea: Lewis is perhaps the most prominent proponent of the view that de re modal predicates are ambiguous.
	From: report of David Lewis (Survival and Identity, with postscript [1983]) by Lynne Rudder Baker - Why Constitution is not Identity n25

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces

12719	Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The notion of force is as clear as that of action and passion, because it is that from which action follows when nothing prevents it.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
	A reaction: For Leibniz, force seems to be a metaphysical notion, rather than a feature of the physical world. I take it to be the bottom level of explanation, and it equates with Aristotelian form and essence.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time

12720	Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Time never exists, since all of its parts never exist together.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
	A reaction: The problem here is that he seems to be admitting that time has 'parts'. Can something have parts and not exist? Events will also fail to exist by this criterion, though we could hardly deny that events (or some such) 'happen'.