19 ideas
3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Philosophical arguments are never incontrovertible - well, hardly ever. Their purpose is to help expound a position, not to coerce agreement. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.419) | |
A reaction: A bit over-cautious, perhaps. Most philosophers are converted to a position when they hear a single key argument, though it is probably 'tipping the balance' of previous discussions. |
3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.412) | |
A reaction: This seems to me the central truth about brains, and we should not be lured into abandoning it. We should not, however, exclude the possibility that there is a non-physical reality. |
3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
Full Idea: In the case of millions of pixels making up a picture on a computer screen, the supervenience is reduction. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.414) | |
A reaction: Since 'supervenience' seems a suspect relationship about which no one is clear, this is a point very much worth making. |
12149 | Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry] |
Full Idea: The essential indexical is a problem for the view that belief is a relation between subjects and propositions conceived as bearers of truth and falsity. | |
From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: My immediate reaction would be that it depends on how you conceive of 'propositions'. If they are objective, you have a problem. I take them to be subjective events in brains, and the indexical meaning to be evident within the proposition. |
3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A mind is an organ of representation. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.421) | |
A reaction: This does not seem to necessarily involve awareness, so it seems to put intentionality at the centre of things. It is a good slogan. |
3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Human pain might be one thing. Martian pain might be something else. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.420) | |
A reaction: A key suggestion in support of type-type physicalism, and against the multiple realisability objection to the identity theory |
3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
Full Idea: My reductionism about mind began as part of an a priori reductionism about everything. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.412) | |
A reaction: He says this is 'a priori' to avoid giving hostages to fortune, but I think is the best explanation of the total evidence facing us |
3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology is a powerful instrument of prediction, …which associates with each mental state a typical causal role. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.416) | |
A reaction: This seems a good account of why we should take folk psychology very seriously, even if it is sometimes wrong (e.g. about people who are mentally ill). |
3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I don't believe that folk psychology says there is a language of thought. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.422) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Jerry Fodor. Certainly folk psychology is a strong theory, but a so-called 'language of thought' (the brain's machine code) seems a much weaker one. |
3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
Full Idea: There is nothing to support the thesis that wide content is the only kind of content, or that it is any way pre-eminent or basic. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.424) | |
A reaction: The idea that all content is 'wide' seems quite wrong. We can't all be wrong about the meaning of a word, because the underlying facts have not yet been discovered. |
3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If the famous brain in a bottle is your exact duplicate in brain states, but only experiences the computer's virtual reality, so that you share no objects of acquaintance, then according to externalists you share no beliefs whatsoever. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.424) | |
A reaction: A very nice reductio ad absurdum of the idea that all concepts and beliefs have external meaning. |
3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
Full Idea: According to externalists, Davidson's 'swampman' is your exact duplicate in brains states, but hasn't had time to become acquainted with much, so he has virtually no beliefs. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.425) | |
A reaction: An implausible fantasy, but it does highlight the fact that beliefs and concepts are primarily internal states. |
4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Wide content is derivative, a product of narrow content and relationships of acquaintance with external things. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.430) | |
A reaction: I would say: content is a mental state, but it is created and fixed by a community, and wide content is the part fixed by experts in the community. We can all be wrong about meanings, and occasionally most of us are wrong about a specialised meaning. |
12151 | If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry] |
Full Idea: If I leave a trail of sugar, and realise 'that I am making a mess', ...when we replace the word 'I' with other designations of me, we no longer have an explanation of my behaviour, or an attribution of the same belief, so it is an 'essential indexical'. | |
From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: [compressed] A famous observation of Perry's, which leads him to challenge traditional accounts of belief and of propositions. I don't think I see a problem, if we have a thoroughly non-linguistic account of essentially unambiguous propositions. |
18412 | Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry] |
Full Idea: We use sentences with indexicals or relativized propositions to individuate belief states, for the purposes of classifying believers in ways useful for explanation and prediction. | |
From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Obvious') | |
A reaction: He goes on to apparently connect this with some sort of moral integrity involved in 'owning up' to the fact that the person in question is you (who has spilled the sugar etc.). |
12150 | Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry] |
Full Idea: The problem of the essential indexical reveals that something is badly wrong with the traditional doctrine of propositions. | |
From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Prob') | |
A reaction: See the reaction to 12149. The traditional view of propositions, or at least Russell's view, seems to be that they are same as facts, which strikes me as daft. I take propositions to be brain events, probably expressed in mentalese. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
15203 | Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |
Full Idea: Tense plays a crucial role in thought and action. | |
From: report of John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 3 a | |
A reaction: This is important, because much of our metaphysics is dominated by a detached 'scientific' description of reality, which is given a rather passive character. If processes take centre stage, which they should, then our own processes are part of it. |
15204 | Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |
Full Idea: In the new tenseless theory, no tensed token sentence can be equivalent to a tenseless token, because the former, unlike the latter, draws attention to the context in which it is tokened. | |
From: report of John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 3 a | |
A reaction: So the problem about indexicals was worrying fans of the tenseless B-series view of time (and so it should). I'm inclined to translate sentences containing indexicals into their actual propositions, which tend to avoid them. 'Time/person of utterance'. |