Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Probabilities of Conditionals' and 'The Problem of Natural Laws'

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3 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington]
     Full Idea: Lewis was first to prove this remarkable result: there is no proposition A*B such that, in all probability distributions, p(A*B) = pA(B) [second A a subscript]. A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition.
     From: report of David Lewis (Probabilities of Conditionals [1976]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 3.1
     A reaction: The equation says the probability of the combination of A and B is not always the same as the probability of B given A. Bennett refers to this as 'The Equation' in the theory of conditionals. Edgington says a conditional is a supposition and a judgement.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Natural laws result from eliminative induction, where enumerative induction gives generalisations [Cohen,LJ, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: Cohen contends that statements that express laws of nature are the products of eliminative induction, where accidentally true generalisations are the products of enumerative induction.
     From: report of L. Jonathan Cohen (The Problem of Natural Laws [1980], p.222) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §7.1
     A reaction: The idea is that enumerative induction only offers the support of positive instances, where eliminative induction involves attempts to falsify a range of hypotheses. This still bases laws on observed regularities, rather than essences or mechanisms.