Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Counterfactuals' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
     Full Idea: Notice that very few philosophers - certainly almost none of the ones who are interesting to read - give you explicitly valid arguments.
     From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.134)
     A reaction: I never thought that was going to happen in philosophy. What I do get is, firstly, lots of interesting reasons for holding beliefs, and a conviction that good beliefs need good reasons, and, secondly, a really coherent view of the world.
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
     Full Idea: Putting forward a valid argument isn't necessarily going to succeed in getting someone to see things your way, because if they don't accept the conclusion, they ask which premises they should reject, or whether an illegitimate assumption is being made.
     From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.136)
     A reaction: Valid arguments are still vital. It is just that good philosophers realise the problem noted here, and spend huge stretches of discussion on establishing acceptance of premises, and showing that there are no dodgy presuppositions.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson]
     Full Idea: Unlike Stalnaker, Lewis holds that indicative conditionals have the truth conditions of material conditionals.
     From: report of David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973]) by Frank Jackson - Conditionals 'Further'
     A reaction: Thus Lewis only uses the possible worlds account for subjunctive conditionals, where Stalnaker uses it for both. Lewis is defending the truth-functional account for the indicative conditionals.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich]
     Full Idea: According to Lewis, a counterfactual holds when the consequent is true in possible worlds very like our own except for the fact that the antecedent is true.
     From: report of David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973]) by Paul Horwich - Lewis's Programme p.213
     A reaction: Presumably the world being very like our own would make it unlikely that there would be anything else to cause the consequent, apart from the counterfactual antecedent.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
An error theory of perception says our experience is not as it seems to be [Martin,M]
     Full Idea: You can end up with an error theory of perception, which says our experience is not as it seems to be, as bizarre as that might be.
     From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.140)
     A reaction: This is because of the clash between subjective and objective aspects of perception. It is an enticing proposal, just the sort of thing I pay philosophers to come up with. Given oddities like blindsight, I think it should be taken seriously.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A contingent generalization is a law of nature if and only if it appears as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that achieves a best combination of simplicity and strength.
     From: David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973], 3.3)