56 ideas
6575 | Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Not only is traditional philosophy incapable of discovering the foundations it seeks, but the philosophical enterprise may itself dislodge the contingent, de facto supports that our daily life depends upon. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: In the end Fogelin is not so pessimistic, but he is worried by the concern of philosophers with paradox and contradiction. I don't remotely consider this a reason to reject philosophy, but it might be a reason to keep it sealed off from daily life. |
8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
Full Idea: There are three ways to give an account: 1) 'I deny it' - this earns a failing mark if the fact is really Moorean. 2) 'I analyse it thus'. 3) 'I accept it as primitive'. Not every account is an analysis. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], '1 Ov Many') | |
A reaction: I prefer Shoemaker's view (Idea 8559). Personally I think 1) should be employed more often than it is (it is a very misunderstood approach). 3) has been overused in recent years (e.g. by Davidson and McGinn). |
6585 | Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: The three main threats to our rational lives are fear of inconsistency, illusions (of absolutism and relativism) and doubt. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is a very nice analysis of the forces that can destroy the philosopher's aspiration to the rational life. Personally I still suffer from a few illusions about the possibility of absolutes, but I may grow out of it. The other three don't bother me. |
6568 | A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: The presence of an inconsistency in the rules that govern a game need not destroy the game. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: He only defends this thesis if the inconsistency is away from the main centre of the action. You can't have an inconsistent definition of scoring a goal or a touchdown. |
6557 | Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: It might be wholly unreasonable to suppose that human beings will ever be able to attain a view of the world that is both suitably rich and completely consistent. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Intro) | |
A reaction: Fogelin's lectures develop this view very persuasively. I think all philosophers must believe that the gods could attain a 'rich and consistent' view. Our problem is that we are a badly organised team, whose members keep dying. |
6560 | The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Traditionally many philosophers (Aristotle among them) have considered the law of noncontradiction to be the deepest, most fundamental principle of rationality. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: For Aristotle, see Idea 1601 (and 'Metaphysics' 1005b28). The only denier of the basic character of the law that I know of is Nietzsche (Idea 4531). Fogelin, despite many qualifications, endorses the law, and so do I. |
6565 | The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: People who reject the law of noncontradiction obliterate any significant difference between asserting something and denying it; …this will not move anyone who genuinely opts either for silence or for madness. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This seems a sufficiently firm and clear assertion of the basic nature of this law. The only rival view seems to be that of Nietzsche (Idea 4531), but then you wonder how Nietzsche is in a position to assert the relativity of the law. |
6574 | Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: There is almost universal agreement that legal reasoning is fundamentally analogical, not deductive, in character. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This raises the question of whether analogy can be considered as 'reasoning' in itself. How do you compare the examples? Could you compare two examples if you lacked language, or rules, or a scale of values? |
8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Supervenience is a stripped down form of reductionism, unencumbered by dubious denials of existence, claims of ontological priority, or claims of translatability. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
A reaction: Interesting. It implies that the honest reductionist (i.e. me) should begin by asserting supervience, and only at a second stage go on to deny a bit of existence, loudly affirm priorities, and offer translations. Honest toil. |
8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
A reaction: Not everyone agrees on this. This says if either A or B change, the change is reflected in the other one. But the other view is of one-way dependence. A only changes if B changes, but B can also make changes that don't affect A. |
8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Final definition of 'Materialism': Among worlds where no natural properties alien to our world are instantiated, no two differ without differing physically; and two such worlds that are exactly alike physically are duplicates. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Min Mat') | |
A reaction: This would presumably allow for an anomalous monist/property dualist view of mind, but not full dualism. But if there are no psychophysical laws, what stops the mental changing while the physical remains the same? |
8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Universals and properties are different because a universal is supposed to be wholly present wherever it is instantiated. A property, by contrast, is spread around. The property of being a donkey is partly present wherever there is a donkey. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
A reaction: No mention of tropes. The claim that universals are widespread, and yet must be instantiated, is dealt with by Lewis's commitment to the existence of possible donkeys. |
10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
Full Idea: Lewis argues that there are natural properties, which makes various analyses possible, especially of similarity in intrinsic respects. Naturalness comes in degrees, with perfectly natural properties being the limiting case. | |
From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 4 | |
A reaction: This sounds to be the wrong way round. We don't start with similarities and work back to natural properties. We encounter natural properties (through their causal action), and these give rise to the similarities. |
16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
Full Idea: For Lewis natural properties are important for their role in making language and thought determinate: principles of charity or humanity tell us to attribute natural properties to predicates wherever possible, break underdetermination of their reference. | |
From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 3.8 | |
A reaction: Lewis always seems to find reasons in semantics or logic for his metaphysics, instead of in the science. Lewis ends up with 'folk' natural properties, instead of accurate ones. |
8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Where my cat (Bruce) ends, there the density of matter, the relative abundance of chemical elements, abruptly change. Bruce is also a locus of causal chains, which traces back to natural properties. Natural properties belong to well demarcated things. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
A reaction: This is an amazingly convoluted way to define natural properties in terms of the classes they generate, but it seems obvious to me that the properties are logically prior to the classes. |
8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Reference consists in part of what we do in language or thought when we refer, but in part it consists in eligibility of the referent. And this eligibility to be referred to is a matter of natural properties. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
A reaction: This is a surprising conclusion for Lewis to reach, having started from properties as any old set members (see Idea 8572). There are references to intentional objects, such as 'there should have been someone on duty'. |
8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
Full Idea: One thing that makes for naturalness of a property is that it is a property belonging exclusively to well-demarcated things (like my cat Bruce, who is a locus of causal chains). | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 8557. Well-demarcated things may also have gerrymandered properties that are parts of 'arbitrary Boolean compounds' (Lewis). Why not make use of the causal chains to identify the properties? |
8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The reason natural properties feature in the contents of our attitudes is that naturalness is part of what it is to feature therein. We aren't built to take a special interest in natural properties, or that we call them natural if they are interesting. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
A reaction: Evolution never features in Lewis's metaphysics. I would have thought we were very much built to focus on natural properties. This sounds odd, and gives no help in distinguishing natural properties from all our other daft contents. |
15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Lewis proposed that all perfectly natural properties are intrinsic. | |
From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], p.355-7) by David Lewis - Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) IX | |
A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'natural', 'property' and 'intrinsic'! Presumably there are natural extrinsic facts, in naturally necessary relationships. If all natural properties are powers, they would have to be intrinsic. Extrinsics would be derivative. |
15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Perhaps we could call a property 'perfectly' natural if its members are all and only those things that share some one universal, ...where the natural properties would be the ones whose sharing makes for resemblance, and the ones relevant to causal powers. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
A reaction: This is Lewis fishing for an account of properties that does a bit better than the mere recourse to set theory (which he intuitively favours) seems to do. He remains neutral about the ontological status of a universal (though he prefers nominalism). |
7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
Full Idea: David Lewis has produced an important theory of properties as sets of actual and possible objects. | |
From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by John Heil - From an Ontological Point of View §12.2 | |
A reaction: The notion that a property is an 'object' sounds wrong, as it is too passive. It also seems to allow for the possibility of uninstantiated properties existing, where properties are presumably always 'of' something. |
8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Any class of things, be it ever so gerrymandered and miscellaneous and indescribable in thought and language, and be it ever so superfluous in characterizing the world, is nevertheless a property. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
A reaction: I much prefer, at the very least, the sparse approach of Armstrong, and in fact would vote for Shoemaker's highly physical view. Lewis proceeds after this to try to pick out the properties that really matter. |
18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
Full Idea: There are so many properties that those specifiable in English, or in the brain's language of synaptic interconnections and neural spikes, could only be an infinitesimal minority. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
A reaction: Thus there are innumerable properties that must lack predicates. But there are also innumerable predicates that correspond to no real properties. I conclude that properties and predicates have very little in common. Job done. |
8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
Full Idea: We need properties, sometimes natural and sometimes not, to provide an adequate supply of semantic values for linguistic expressions. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
A reaction: A characteristically twentieth century approach, which I find puzzling. We don't need a Loch Ness Monster in order to use the term 'Loch Ness Monster'. Lewis appears to have been a pupil of Quine... He was not, though, a Predicate Nominalist. |
14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Lewis has a preference for a nominalist conception of properties as classes of possible and actual concrete particulars. | |
From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects II.3 | |
A reaction: I'm sympathetic to nominalism, but still can't swallow the idea that a property like redness is nothing more than a collection of particulars, the red things. This class will include all sorts of non-red features. |
15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: According to Lewis's conception, the causal powers of a property are constituted by its patterned relations to other properties in the particular Humean mosaic that is the actual world. | |
From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by John Hawthorne - Causal Structuralism Intro | |
A reaction: I just can't grasp this as a serious proposal. Relations cannot be the bottom line in explanation of the world. What are the relata? I take powers to be primitive. |
8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Properties do nothing to capture the causal powers of things. Almost all properties are causally irrelevant, and there is nothing to make the relevant ones stand out from the crowd. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
A reaction: Shoemaker, who endorses a causal account of properties, has a go at this problem in Idea 8557. The property of being massive is more likely to be causal than existing fifty years after D-Day. Lewis attempts later to address the problem. |
8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I suspend judgement about universals themselves; I only insist that, one way or another, their work must be done. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: This seems surprising (but admirable) in a great metaphysician, but I suppose it is symptomatic of the Humean approach to metaphysics. In the light of Ideas 3989 and 3990, I would have expected Lewis to deny universals. He probably did. |
21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
Full Idea: For Lewis, we can see the purpose of physics as being to discover what universals there actually are. | |
From: report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics Intro | |
A reaction: It seems that Lewis uses the word 'property' to mean predicates, which consist of a multitude of sets, while universals are the properties that naturally exist and cut nature at the joints . Infuriating, because the other way around seems better. |
8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The transformed problem of One over Many (in terms of predication, rather than sameness of type) deserves our neglect. The ostrich that will not look at it is a wise bird indeed. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], '1 Ov Many') | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Armstrong, and defends Quine. The remark moves Ostrich Nominalism from the category of joke to the category of respectable. I think I side with Armstrong. How is predication primitive if it has two components? |
8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
Full Idea: To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things. (Note: this resembles the doctrine of Class Nominalism, but I do not claim to solve the One Over Many problem by this means, far from it). | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop') | |
A reaction: Lewis remains neutral about the traditional question of whether universals exist. What does he mean by "is" in his assertion? Identity, predication or class membership? I think Lewis is open to many of the objections to Class Nominalism. |
8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Moderate Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism (in its present form) seem to me to be a single theory presented in different styles. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop' n9) | |
A reaction: Lewis has earlier endorsed a cautious form of Class Nominalism (Idea 8570). Which comes first, having a resemblance, or being in a class? Quine seems to make resemblance basic (Idea 8486), but Lewis seems to make the class basic (Idea 8572). |
6582 | Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Convention, to exist at all, must have a basis in something that is not conventional; conventions, to work, need something nonconventional to build upon and shape. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Fogelin attributes his point to Hume. I agree entirely. No convention could ever possibly catch on in a society unless there were some point to it. If you can't see a point to a convention (like wearing ties) then start looking, because it's there. |
6576 | My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: My own view might be called 'circumspect rationalism' - the view that our intellectual faculties provide our only means for comprehending the world in which we find oruselves. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: He needs to say more than that to offer a theory, but I like the label, and it fits the modern revival of rationalism, with which I sympathise, and which rests, I think, on Russell's point that self-evidence comes in degrees, not as all-or-nothing truth. |
6589 | Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: In general a knowledge claim is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The problem here is what is 'relevant'. Fogelin's example is 'Are you sure the suspect doesn't have a twin brother?' If virtual reality is relevant, most knowledge is defeated. Certainly, imaginative people feel that they know less than others. |
6596 | For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Coherentists argue that if the circle of justifications is big enough, rich enough, coherent enough, and so on, then there is nothing wrong circularity. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: There must always be something wrong with circularity, and no god would put up with it, but we might have to. Of course, two pieces of evidence might be unconnected, such as an equation and an observation. |
6597 | A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: One rule for the justification of knowledge might be: Do not raise the level of scrutiny in the absence of a particular reason that triggers it. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: That won't decide the appropriate level of scrutiny from which to start. One of my maxims is 'don't set the bar too high', but it seems tough that one should have to justify moving it. The early scientists tried raising it, and were amazed by the results. |
6588 | Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: The three forms of scepticism are cartesian, Humean and Pyrrhonian. The first challenges belief by inventing sceptical scenarios; the second doubts the future; the third aims to suspend belief. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: A standard distinction is made between methodological and global scepticism. The former seems to be Cartesian, and the latter Pyrrhonian. The interest here is see Hume placed in a distinctive category, because of his views on induction. |
6590 | Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Sceptical scenarios deal in wildly remote defeating possibilities, so that the level of scrutiny becomes unrestrictedly high, and they also usually deal with defeators that are in principle ineliminable. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The question of how high we 'set the bar' seems to me central to epistemology. There is clearly an element of social negotiation involved, centring on what is appropriate. If, though, scepticism is 'ineliminable', we must face up to that. |
6583 | Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: We reach radical perspectivism by replacing Kant's single, necessary categorial scheme with a plurality of competing categorial schemes. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: It certainly looks as if Kant sent us down a slippery slope into the dafter aspects of twentieth century relativism. The best antidote I know of is Davidson's (e.g. Idea 6398). But then it seems unimaginative to say that only one scheme is possible. |
8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Psychophysical identity is a two-way street: if all mental properties are physical, then some physical properties are mental; but then all physical properties might be mental, or every property of everything might be both physical and mental. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Min Mat') | |
A reaction: I suspect that this is the thought that has impressed Galen Strawson. The whole story seems to include the existence of 'mental properties' as a distinct category. This line of thought strikes me as a serious misunderstanding. |
6555 | We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: We as human beings are also irrational animals, unique among animals in our capacity to place faith in bizarre fictions of our own construction. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is glaringly true, and a very nice corrective to the talk of Greeks and others about man as the 'rational animal'. From a distance we might be described by Martians as the 'mad animal'. Is the irrational current too strong to swim against? |
8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Unlike principles of crude charity, sophisticated principles of charity call for imputations of error in the subject if he has lived in deceptive conditions. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
A reaction: This begs lots of questions about how you decide conditions are 'deceptive' if you have not yet embarked on your radical interpretation of the subject. Davidson's point still stands, that imputing truth must be the normal procedure. |
8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
Full Idea: We need natural properties, so that the principle of charity will impute a bias towards believing that things are green rather than grue, and towards a basic desire for long life, rather than long-life-unless-one-was-born-on-a-Monday.... | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
A reaction: Lewis always seems to be approaching things from the wrong end. We don't need properties so that we can attribute charity, so that we can interpret. We interpret, because we can be charitable, because we all experience natural properties. |
6605 | Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Critics must become causally entangled with their subject matter. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This remark is built on Hume's views. You may have a strong view about a singer, but it may be hard to maintain when someone plays you six rival versions of the same piece. I agree entirely with the remark. It means there are aesthetic experts. |
6607 | The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Like the word 'good', the word 'beautiful', when deprived of contextual support, is nearly contentless. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: If I say with, for example, Oscar Wilde that beauty is the highest ideal in life, this doesn't strike me as contentless, but I still sympathise with Fogelin's notion that beauty is rooted in particulars. |
6604 | Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: "It is all a matter of taste" may be an all-purpose stopper of discussions of aesthetic values, but it also completely severs the connection with the actual properties of the object under consideration. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This remark grows out of his discussion of Hume. I like this remark, which ties in with Particularism in morality, and with the central role of experiments in science. The world forces beliefs on us. |
6586 | Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Cynics are usually unswerving in their commitment to a moral ideal, but disappointed or disgusted by humanity's failure to meet it. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I felt quite suicidal the other day when I saw someone park diagonally across two parking spaces. They can't seem to grasp the elementary Kantian slogan 'What if everybody did that?' It's all hopeless. I wonder if I am becoming a bit of a Cynic? |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
6572 | Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: The purposes of punishment include deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation, and retribution, but they don't always sit well together. Deterrence is best served by making prisons miserable places, but this may run counter to rehabilitation. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: It seems to most educated people that retribution should be pushed far down the list if we are to be civilised (see Idea 1659), and yet personal revenge for a small act of aggression seems basic, normal and acceptable. We dream of rehabilitation. |
6573 | Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: A strict retributivist is likely to say that once a crime is paid for, that's that; a deterrence theorist is likely to say that the protection of potential victims overrides the released convict's right to a free and fresh start. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Interesting since the retributivist here has the more liberal attitude. Reformists will also have a dilemma when years in prison have failed to reform the convict. Virtue theorists like balance, and sensitively consider our relations with the criminals. |
8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A counterfactual can be said to 'backtrack' if it can be said that if the present were different a different past would have led up to it (rather than if the present were different, the same past would have had a different outcome). | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
A reaction: A nice clear definition of a concept which is important in Lewis's analysis of causation. In the current context he is concerned with elucidation of determinism and materialism. I would say (intuitively) that all counterfactuals backtrack. |
8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
Full Idea: My counterfactual analysis of causation needs counterfactuals that avoid backtracking; else the analysis faces fatal counterexamples involving epiphenomenal side-effects or cases of causal preemption. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Laws and C') | |
A reaction: The concept of true epiphenomena (absolutely no causal powers) strikes me as bogus. |
8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Physics must not just discover laws and causal explanations. In putting forward as comprehensive theories that recognise only a limited range of natural properties, physics proposes inventories of the natural properties instantiated in our world. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Min Mat') | |
A reaction: Physics does this job extremely well, offering things like force, spin, charge that are the building blocks for their theories. There is metaphysics at the heart of physics, unavoidably. |
15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Physics aspires to give an inventory of natural properties. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
A reaction: The sort of beautifully simple remark by which philosophers ought to earn a good living in the intellectual community. Come on physicists - this is all we want! Presumably the inventory will include an account of how they all work. |
8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system (or, in case of ties, in every ideal system). | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Laws and C') | |
A reaction: Reminiscent of Peirce's view of truth (Idea 7661). This wouldn't seem to eliminate the danger of regularities with underlying causes ending up as laws (day causes night). Or very trivial regularities ending up as laws. |