16 ideas
9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Organisms come to better understand their worlds by coming to better understand themselves and the ways in which their own structures engage their worlds. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §III) | |
A reaction: Van Gulick is defending a higher-order theory of consciousness, but this strikes me as a good rationale for the target of philosophy, which has increasingly (since Descartes) focused on understanding our own minds. |
15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Not all events involve change. We cannot afford to count the unchanges as nonevents, for the unchanges may be needed to complete causal histories. | |
From: David Lewis (Events [1986], VI) | |
A reaction: You end up calling non-changes 'events' if you commit to a simplistic theory that all causal histories consist of events. Why not allow conditions as well as events? Lewis concedes that he may be abusing language. |
15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
Full Idea: There is no guarantee that events made for semantics are the same as events that are causes and effects. | |
From: David Lewis (Events [1986], I) | |
A reaction: This little cri de couer could be a motto for a huge amount of analytic philosophy, which (for some odd reason) thought that mathematics, logic, set theory and formal semantics were good tools for explaining nature. |
15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Events have their essences built in, in the form of necessary conditions for their occurrence. | |
From: David Lewis (Events [1986], III) | |
A reaction: Revealing. He thinks the essence of an event is something which precedes the event. I take it as obvious that if an event has an essence, it will be some features of the event that occur in it and during it. They need to be intrinsic. |
15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If events are classes, as I propose, then they have a mereology in the way that all classes do: the parts of a class are its subclasses. | |
From: David Lewis (Events [1986], V) | |
A reaction: Lewis says events are properties, which he regards as classes. It is not clear that events are strictly mereological. Could one happening be two events? Is WWII a simple sum of its parts? [see p.260] |
15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I propose to identify an event with a property, or in other words with a class, a unique spatio-temporal region corresponding to where that event occurs. | |
From: David Lewis (Events [1986], II) | |
A reaction: [I've run together two separate bits, on p.244 and 245] Lewis cites Montague's similar view, that events are properties of times. |
15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Properties are abundant, numbering at least beth-3 for properties of individuals alone; they are suited to serve as semantic values of arbitrarily complex predicates and gerunds, and higher-order variables. (If there are universals, they are sparse). | |
From: David Lewis (Events [1986], II n2) | |
A reaction: To me this is an outrageous hijacking of the notion of property which is needed for explaining the natural world. He seems to be talking about predicates. He wants to leave me with his silly universals - well I don't want them, thank you. |
9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
Full Idea: In contrast with standard notions of knowledge, the concept of understanding emphasizes the element of practical engagement from the outset. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §II) | |
A reaction: This could be the very interesting germ of a huge revolution in our approach to epistemology, which I find rather appealing. Plato's desire that knowledge should have 'logos' seems to me in the same area. It sounds rather internalist, which is good. |
9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §II) | |
A reaction: This thought could rather rapidly revive the discredited notion of knowing-how. I think it might slot into an account of the mind in terms of levels, so that my internalist view of knowledge emerges at higher levels, built on more basic responses. |
9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is a really good key question, which has hovered over the debate since Locke's definition of a person (as 'self-aware'). I take the self to be a mechanism of most brains, which is prior to consciousness. Maybe the two are inseparable. |
9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Higher-order thought (HOT) models treat metastates as thought-like, and higher-order perception (HOP) models regard them as at least quasi-perceptual and resulting from some form of inner monitoring or inner sense. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I) | |
A reaction: I would understand 'thought' to at least partially involve judgements. The HOT theory (Carruthers) seems to suit epistemological foundationalists, who want truth to enter on the ground floor. This pushes me towards the HOP model (Lycan) as more plausible. |
9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Higher-order models would effectively reduce the problem of consciousness to that of intentionality. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I) | |
A reaction: This gives the bigger picture - that higher-order theories are the cutting edge of attempts to give a naturalistic, reductivist account of consciousness. That seems to be the only way to go, so we should encourage them in the enterprise. |
9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Some higher-order theorists say we have qualitative but unconscious mental states of color or pain (qualia), but there is nothing it is like to be in such a state, which needs higher-order awareness. The meta-states are devoid of qualia. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I.5) | |
A reaction: He calls this the 'stranded qualia' problem. Clearly one begins to sharpen Ockham's Razor at this point, if the higher-level state isn't contributing something. I don't rule out unconscious qualia. The strength of a real pain is distorted in a dream. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Causation is the ancestral of causal dependence: event c causes event e iff either e depends on c, or e depends on an intermediate event which in turn depends on c, or.... | |
From: David Lewis (Events [1986], I) | |
A reaction: This is Lewis making sure that we don't postulate some huge bogus thing called 'Causation' which is supposed to be in charge of Nature. Good point. |
9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |
Full Idea: From the teleopragmatic perspective, life itself is largely an informational process. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006]) | |
A reaction: From the cynical perspective a human is just 'blood and foul smell in a bag', but that may not give you whole story. The point here is that the informational view will cover both the genetic and the mental levels of human life. True but unilluminating? |