12 ideas
| 15457 | Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: All circles of interdefinition are useless by themselves. But if we reach one of the interdefined pair, then we have them both. | |
| From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], IV) |
| 15400 | We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron] |
| Full Idea: Lewis revised his analysis of duplication because he had assumed that as a matter of necessity perfectly natural properties are intrinsic, and that necessarily how a thing is intrinsically is determined completely by the natural properties it has. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998]) by Ross P. Cameron - Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties 'Analysis' | |
| A reaction: [This compares Lewis 1986:61 with Langton and Lewis 1998] I am keen on both intrinsic and on natural properties, but I have not yet confronted this little problem. Time for a displacement activity, I think.... |
| 15458 | A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A property is 'intrinsic' iff it never can differ between duplicates; iff whenever two things (actual or possible) are duplicates, either both of them have the property or both of them lack it. | |
| From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], IV) | |
| A reaction: This leaves me wondering how one could arrive at a precise definition of 'duplicates'. Can it be done without mentioning that they have the same intrinsic properties? |
| 15459 | Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The property of being an ellipsoidal star would seem offhand to be a basic intrinsic property, but it is incompatible (nomologically) with being an isolated object. | |
| From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], V) | |
| A reaction: Another nice example from Lewis. It makes you wonder whether the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction should go. Modern physics, with its 'entanglements', doesn't seem to suit the distinction. |
| 6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: I'm not convinced by this, as a simple rule. If I spend my whole life doing just the minimum for my own survival, I don't see why I should have to justify that, and I don't see a state is obliged to justify it either. |
| 6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: My own view is that moral justification must be capable of motivating, but not in virtue of reliance on pre-moral motives. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: This may well be the core and essence of Kantian moral theory. I'm inclined to think of it as 'Kant's dream', which is of ultra-rational beings who are driven by pure rationality as a motivator. People who fit this bill tend to be academics. |
| 6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: I do not favour the route taken by Hobbes's modern descendants, using game theory, since I believe the impersonal standpoint makes an essential contribution to individual motivation which must be addressed by any ethically acceptable theory. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: The assumption of self-seeking at the core of game theory seems very bizarre, and leads to moral approval of free riders. Nagel offers the best response, which is the Kantian impersonal view. Nagel may be optimistic about motivation, though. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: In pursuit of the kind of objectivity needed in the physical sciences, we abstract even from our humanity; but nothing further than abstraction from our identity (that is, who we are) enters into ethical theory. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: The 'brief' summary of this boils down to a nice and interesting slogan. It epitomises the modern Kantian approach to ethics. But compare Idea 4122, from Bernard Williams. |
| 6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: It is implicit in the categorical imperative that I can will that everyone should adopt as a maxim only what everyone else can also will that everyone should adopt as a maxim. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: This is a nice move, because it shifts the theory away from a highly individualistic Cartesian view of morality towards the idea that morality is a community activity. |
| 6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: A legitimate system is one which reconciles the two universal principles of impartiality and reasonable partiality so that no one can object that his interests are not being accorded sufficient weight or that the demands on him are excessive. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This seems an appealing principle, and a nice attempt at stating the core of Kantian liberalism. It is obviously influenced by Scanlon's contractualist view, in the idea that 'no one can object', because everyone sees the justification. |
| 6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: As things are, democracy is the enemy of comprehensive equality, once the poor cease to be a majority. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.9) | |
| A reaction: This is obvious once you think about it, but it is well worth saying, because it is tempting to think that we live in an 'equal' society, merely because we are equal in things such as voting rights and equality before the law. |