Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth'' and 'On Multiplying Entities'

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8 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
8207 The quest for simplicity drove scientists to posit new entities, such as molecules in gases [Quine]
     Full Idea: It is the quest for system and simplicity that has kept driving the scientist to posit further entities as values of his variables. By positing molecules, Boyles' law of gases could be assimilated into a general theory of bodies in motion.
     From: Willard Quine (On Multiplying Entities [1974], p.262)
     A reaction: Interesting that a desire for simplicity might lead to multiplications of entities. In fact, I presume molecules had been proposed elsewhere in science, and were adopted in gas-theory because they were thought to exist, not because simplicity is nice.
8208 In arithmetic, ratios, negatives, irrationals and imaginaries were created in order to generalise [Quine]
     Full Idea: In classical arithmetic, ratios were posited to make division generally applicable, negative numbers to make subtraction generally applicable, and irrationals and finally imaginaries to make exponentiation generally applicable.
     From: Willard Quine (On Multiplying Entities [1974], p.263)
     A reaction: This is part of Quine's proposal (c.f. Idea 8207) that entities have to be multiplied in order to produce simplicity. He is speculating. Maybe they are proposed because they are just obvious, and the generality is a nice side-effect.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
10845 To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Sentences or assertions can be derivately called true, if they succeed in expressing determinate propositions. A sentence can be ambiguous or vague or paradoxical or ungrounded or not declarative or a mere expression of feeling.
     From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001], p.276)
     A reaction: Lewis has, of course, a peculiar notion of what a proposition is - it's a set of possible worlds. I, with my more psychological approach, take a proposition to be a particular sort of brain event.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
10847 Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Instances of the truthmaker principle are equivalent to biconditionals not about truth but about the existential grounding of all manner of other things; the flying pigs, or what-have-you.
     From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001])
     A reaction: The question then is what the difference is between 'existential grounding' and 'truth'. There wouldn't seem to be any difference at all if the proposition in question was a simple existential claim.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
10846 Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The truthmaker principle seems to be a version of the correspondence theory of truth, but differs mostly in denying that the correspondence of truths to facts must be one-to-one.
     From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001], p.277)
     A reaction: In other words, several different sentences might have exactly the same truthmaker.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8205 Explaining events just by bodies can't explain two events identical in space-time [Quine]
     Full Idea: An account of events just in terms of physical bodies does not distinguish between events that happen to take up just the same portion of space-time. A man's whistling and walking would be identified with the same temporal segment of the man.
     From: Willard Quine (On Multiplying Entities [1974], p.260)
     A reaction: We wouldn't want to make his 'walking' and his 'strolling' two events. Whistling and walking are different because different objects are involved (lips and legs). Hence a man is not (ontologically) a single object.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
8206 Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia [Quine]
     Full Idea: The need to add a note of necessity to 'all black crows are black' could be met by a generalisation over classes (what belongs to sets x and y belongs to y), or maybe be quantifying over possible particulars.
     From: Willard Quine (On Multiplying Entities [1974], p.262)
     A reaction: He dislikes the second strategy because 'unactualized particulars are an obscure and troublesome lot'. The second is the strategy of Lewis. I think necessity starts to creep back in as soon as you ask WHY a generalisation holds true.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').