12897
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To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
If you claim that S knows that P, and yet grant that S cannot eliminate a certain possibility of not-P, it certainly seems as if you have granted that S does not after all know that P. To speak of fallible knowledge just sounds contradictory.
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From:
David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996], p.419)
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A reaction:
Starting from this point, fallibilism seems to be a rather bold move. The only sensible response seems to be to relax the requirement that not-P must be eliminable. Best: in one epistemic context P, in another not-P.
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19562
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We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
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Full Idea:
S knows P if S's evidence eliminates every alternative. But the nature of the alternatives depends on context. So for Lewis, the context sensitivity of 'knows' is a function of contextual restrictions ln the domain of quantification.
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From:
report of David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996]) by Stewart Cohen - Contextualism Defended (and reply) 1
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A reaction:
A typical modern attempt to 'regiment' a loose term like 'context'. That said, I like the idea. I'm struck by how the domain varies during a conversation (as in 'what we are talking about'). Domains standardly contain 'objects', though.
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23981
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Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James]
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Full Idea:
Can one fancy a state of rage and picture no flushing of the face, no dilation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action? …A purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity.
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From:
William James (What is an Emotion? [1884], p.194), quoted by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 3 'Bodily'
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A reaction:
Plausible for rage, but less so for irritation or admiration. Goldie thinks James is wrong. James says if intellectual feelings don't become bodily then they don't qualify as emotions. No True Scotsman!
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7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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