98 ideas
| 4171 | Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 027) | |
| A reaction: I think what draws people to philosophy is an interest in whatever is timeless. Contingent reality is so frustrating and exhausting. Hence I agree. |
| 4186 | Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Every person is conscious of all philosophical truths, but to bring them to conceptual awareness, to reflection, is the business of the philosopher. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.68) | |
| A reaction: I like this. All human beings are philosophical. It seems unlikely, though, that we are all pre-conceptually conscious of the higher levels of philosophical logic. |
| 12171 | Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: The more correct the subsumption of objects from one point of view, and the greater and more glaring the incongruity from another point of view, the greater is the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 013), quoted by Roger Scruton - Laughter §5 | |
| A reaction: This accounts for ludicrous humour, but there seem to be plenty of other types. Exceptional stupidity is usually amusing without necessarily being incongruous. Though it is a departure from the sensible norm. |
| 21366 | Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: The task of metaphysics is not to pass over experience in which the world exists, but to understand it thoroughly, since inner and outer experience are certainly the principal source of all knowledge. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 428), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will' | |
| A reaction: I wonder to what extent he meant ordinary experience, and to what extent he was advocating the study if science? |
| 20910 | Everything happens necessarily, and for a reason [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Nothing happens at random, but everything for a reason and as the effect of necessity. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B002), quoted by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.25.4 | |
| A reaction: [In Aetius 'Stob'] This remark reminds us of the link between necessity and sufficient reason. Do all reasons arise for a reason? |
| 16146 | Two can't be a self-contained unit, because it would need to be one to do that [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democritus claimed that one substance could not be composed from two nor two from one. …The same will clearly go for number, on the popular assumption that number is a combination of units. Unless two is one, it cannot contain a unit in actuality. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1039a15 | |
| A reaction: Chrysippus followed this up the first part with the memorable example of Dion and Theon. The problem with the second part is that 2, 3 and 4 are three numbers, so they can count as meta-units. |
| 4168 | Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: In my system matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which exist only for each other, and so exist only relatively. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I.Supp) | |
| A reaction: A plausible picture, but built from dualist presuppositions. Personally I think intellect is built out of matter, so I am not going down Schopenhauer's road. |
| 20901 | True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In response to defenders of the One, Democritus says that what is, in the proper sense, is being that is completely full, but that such a being is not one, but that they are unlimited in number and invisible because of the smallness of their masses. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A007) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 325a28 | |
| A reaction: Democritus is in a tangle here. He says proper being has no void, having apparently conceded that motion needs void (which he admits is non-existent). So true being only occurs when everything grinds to a halt, which is not now. But Idea 20902. |
| 20902 | Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: They say that being does not exist more than non-being, because neither does the void exist more than the body. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b09 | |
| A reaction: The claim that Being and Non-Being are the same thing is pretty startling. It seems to be an expedient to get Void into the picture, even though it is taken to be wholly devoid of qualities. |
| 20904 | The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: What exists does not exist at all more than what does not exist, and both are causes in a similar way for the things that come about. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A008), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' p.28.4-27 | |
| A reaction: [Simplicius actually attributes this to the shadowy Leucippus] You can see the point. If you drive into a pothole, that has considerable causal powers. |
| 20903 | The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: They say that what is differs only by Configuration ([rhusmos], which is the shape), by Disposition ([diathege], which is the order), and by Turning ([tropê], which is the position. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b16 | |
| A reaction: If you give the shape, structure and position of an object, there is no much more to say. Perhaps mention time. |
| 20893 | Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Nothing comes into being from what does not exist, nor is it destroyed into what does not exist. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A001) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.44 | |
| A reaction: [part of a concise summary of Democritus by DL] Probably an intuition about conservation laws, rather than a speculation about the Big Bang. |
| 21926 | Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| Full Idea: Schopenhauer radically departs from his fellow idealists in his assertion of the irrational character of reality. | |
| From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4 | |
| A reaction: This is the rejection of the original confidence about rationality of the stoics. And yet Schopenauer saw the principle of sufficient reason as axiomatic. Not sure how to reconcile those. Lewis identifies this idea as 'Romantic'. |
| 4167 | The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: The world has two poles - the knowing subject and crude matter, which are both completely unknowable, the former because it is the knower, the latter because without form and quality it cannot be perceived. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp) | |
| A reaction: A nice concept, that all of reality comes from their relationship, but the two components are intrinsically unknowable. Does God the Knower know his own mind? |
| 20896 | It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: In reality [eteé] to recognise what sort each thing is, belongs to what is impracticable [aporos]. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B008), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137 | |
| A reaction: On the whole modern scientists (and the rest of us) shoehorn virtually everything into a specific category. It strikes me as wildly bad metaphysics to say that everything necessarily has its category. |
| 3357 | Democritus denies reality to large objects, because atomic entities can't combine to produce new ones [Benardete,JA on Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Democritus appears to rule out from his austere ontology all so-called emergent entities - even mountains and rivers - on the ground that two or more entities can never combine to produce a new one. | |
| From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.24 |
| 598 | Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democritus claimed that one substance could not be composed from two nor two from one; for him it is the atoms that are the substances. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1039a10 |
| 4165 | Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: By taking Cogito Ergo Sum as the only certainty, and by his provisionally regarding the existence of the world as problematical, the essential starting point of all philosophy was found, and its true focus in the subjective, the individual consciousness. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp) | |
| A reaction: Some people think this was a disaster, not a triumph. Descartes could have doubted himself and accepted the world as his starting point. |
| 21923 | Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Some say Schopenhauer would be less misunderstood if he had used 'force' or 'energy' rather than 'will' to characterise inner natures. But this would have steered his idealism towards materialism, of which he was an avowed opponent. | |
| From: comment on Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4 | |
| A reaction: I presume therefore that Nietzsche's will to power is a commitment to materialism, since it occurs in material objects as well as minds. |
| 4162 | The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: The world which surrounds man exists only as idea - that is, only in relation to something else, the one who conceives the idea, which is himself. If any truth can be enunciated a priori, it is this. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 001) | |
| A reaction: Yes, but the idea we have is of a real world. It is definitely not part of the idea that it is an idea (unlike my idea for a Christmas present). |
| 21922 | We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: The double knowledge of the nature and action of our own body is the key to the inner being of every phenomenon in nature. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 105), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4 | |
| A reaction: Lewis calls this 'the heart of his philosophy'. Bodily awareness comes from acts of willing. So Lewis says 'the thing-in-itself is revealed to us in willing'. We experience Being and causation. Is he trying to combine idealism with the thing-in-itself? |
| 21913 | Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Kant's greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-in-itself. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 417 App), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3 | |
| A reaction: This is Schopenhauer firmly opposing the Absolute Idealism of Kant's successors, who dismissed the 'thing-in-itsef'. |
| 1532 | Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
| Full Idea: As proof of the fact that sensible qualities have no real existence he points to the fact that they do not appear the same to all creatures. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A135) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 63 |
| 20894 | Man is separated from reality [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary to recognise that man by virtue of this criterion is separated from reality. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B006), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137 | |
| A reaction: I don't know what 'this criterion' is, but it strikes me as quite a good slogan for fans (like myself) of the representative theory of perception. Critics say it is the big objection to the representative theory, but I say 'get over it'. |
| 4164 | Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: What the eye, the ear, or the hand feels, is not perception, it is merely data. Only when the understanding passes from the effect to the cause does the world lie before us as perception extended in space. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 004) | |
| A reaction: These certainly seems to be a sense-data theory. Philosophers are much more ready to separate the data from the understanding than neuroscientists are. |
| 4163 | All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: All perception is intellectual. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 004) | |
| A reaction: Even in slugs? I suspect that this is a tautology. Schopenhauer will only allow my vision or hearing to become 'perception' when an intellectual element enters into it. |
| 517 | All evidence comes from senses, so they are indispensable to the mind [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Mind must never reject the senses, because that is where it gets its evidence, and it would be the mind's downfall. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B125), quoted by Galen - On Medical Experience 15.8 |
| 20897 | Obscure knowledge belongs to the five senses, and genuine knowledge is the other type [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: There are two forms of knowledge [gnomé], the one genuine, the other obscure. And to the obscure one belongs all of these: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The other is genuine, and is separated from this one. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B011), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.139 | |
| A reaction: [Sextus goes on to make it clear that the 'genuine' one is knowledge acquired by thought]. I take Parmenides to be the first rationalist. It is interesting that Democritus, who devoted his life to finding causal explanations, seems to be a rationalist. |
| 577 | Democritus says there is either no truth, or it is concealed from us [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democritus concludes that either there is no truth or it is concealed from us. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A112) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1009b12 |
| 20895 | We actually know nothing, and opinions are mere flux [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Certainly this argument too makes it clear that in reality [eteé] we know nothing about anything, but for each person opinion is a rhythmic afflux [epirhusmié]. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B007), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137 | |
| A reaction: This seems to pick 'all is flux' up from Heraclitus, and make Democritus (along with aspects of Socrates) the true source of ancient scepticism. |
| 1528 | We in fact know nothing, but we each restructure our reality with beliefs [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: In reality we know nothing about anything, but belief restructures things for each of us. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B007), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.136 |
| 492 | It is obviously impossible to understand the reality of each thing [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: It will be obvious that it is impossible to understand how in reality each thing is. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B008), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.137 |
| 515 | We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B117), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.72.10 |
| 20892 | Democritus was devoted to discovering causal explanations [Democritus, by Eusebius] |
| Full Idea: Democritus himself, as they say, stated that he would rather discover a single causal explanation [aitiologia] than become the King of the Persians. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B118) by Eusebius - Preparation for the Gospel 14.27.4 | |
| A reaction: Democritus seems to be clearly the father of the physical sciences, because he focused single-mindedly on physical and causal explanations. David Lewis says all explanations are causal. |
| 5882 | Democritus says soul consists of smooth round bodies brought together in accidental collision [Democritus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Since Democritus makes the soul consist of minute smooth round bodies brought together in some sort of accidental collision, let us pass him over. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Tusculan Disputations I.xi.23 | |
| A reaction: If we accept that Democritus thought the collision of atoms 'accidental', then it doesn't sound like a very good theory. What would Cicero say if we replaced 'accidental' with 'naturally selected'? |
| 6034 | Atomists say soul has a rational part in the chest, and a diffused non-rational part [Democritus, by Aetius] |
| Full Idea: Democritus and Epicurus say the soul has two parts, one which is rational and is situated in the chest area, and the other which is non-rational and is spread throughout the entire compound of the body. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aetius - fragments/reports 4.4.6 | |
| A reaction: The spread part corresponds to such things as feeling fear in the stomach, or excitement throughout the limbs. I can't think what grounds there would be for choosing the chest as the home of reason. I suppose you can hear reason thumping in there.. |
| 20912 | The soul is the same as the mind [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democritus says the soul is the same thing as the mind. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A101) by Aristotle - De Anima 405a10 | |
| A reaction: This is not in contrast to the Christian concept of the soul, but in contrast to the normal view of psuché, which is more like the life that permeates the whole body. Democritus was more in tune than Aristotle with modern thought on this. |
| 20916 | Animals have a share of reason [Democritus, by Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Democritus recognised that animals have a share of reason. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Porphyry - On Abstinence 3.6.7 | |
| A reaction: Since he considers thinking to be the interaction of atoms in the body, which animals evidently possess, this seems consistent. No one seems to observed animals closely before the 20th century, other than to exploit them. |
| 20914 | The directive centre is located in the whole head [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Democritus says [the directive centre is located] in the whole head. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A105) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 4.5.1 | |
| A reaction: The whole head is not quite the brain, but he is getting very warm indeed, and long before anyone else got so close. |
| 4166 | A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: A consciousness without an object is no consciousness. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp) | |
| A reaction: This hints at Hume's observations about the self. Certainly totally vacant consciousness seems inconceivable, but is that a necessary or a contingent truth? |
| 21369 | We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: We often do not know what we desire or fear. For years we can have a desire without admitting it to ourselves ....because the intellect is not to know anything about it, since the good opinion we have of ourselves would inevitably suffer thereby. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 210), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 5 'Will' | |
| A reaction: The idea of unconscious thought crept up well before Freud. It is in La Rochefoucauld, and important in Nietzsche. Neuroscience seems to give it a strong priority over the conscious mind, which is a revolutionary idea. |
| 21367 | I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: My body is the only object of which I know not merely the one side, that of the representation, but also the other, that is called 'will'. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 125), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will' | |
| A reaction: I'm not convinced that knowledge of the body through the will (and action, presumably) constitutes a different sort of knowledge. Philosophers are always trying to split the world in two (but not Nietzsche!). |
| 4175 | It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: It is as perverse to desire the continuity of one's individuality which is being replaced by other individuals, as to desire the permanence of the body's substance which is always being replaced by new substance. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.54) | |
| A reaction: If I let that go, what am I supposed to hang on to? Nothing? Non-existence is not an attractive condition to aspire to. |
| 4176 | We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Everyone regards himself a priori as free in his individual actions, and only a posteriori sees that necessarily his actions follow from the coincidence of character with motives. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.55) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure what experience shows. Necessity seems more obvious when observing other people. Samuel Johnson said experience showed freedom, not necessity. |
| 6033 | Democritus said everything happens of necessity, by natural motion of atoms [Democritus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Democritus, the founder of atomism, preferred to accept that all things happened by necessity than to tear from the atomic bodies their natural motions. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') §22 | |
| A reaction: This is in opposition to Epicurus, who said that atoms can have a 'swerve', making free will possible. It is suggested that Epicurus was the first to really grasp the problem of free will. Democritus was just stating the (to him) obvious. |
| 5088 | Some say there is a determinate cause for every apparently spontaneous event [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some people (Democritus?) say there is no such thing as a chance event; they claim that there is always a determinate cause for everything which is said to be a chance or a spontaneous event. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 195b37 | |
| A reaction: This is the mutual implication of physicalism and determinism, which strikes me as unavoidable. I say: don't panic about morality because determinism is true. Embrace determinism - it is harmless and true. Its opposite is a nonsense. |
| 21670 | Democritus said atoms only move by their natural motions, which are therefore necessary [Democritus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: The author of the atomic theory, Democritus, preferred to accept the view that all events are caused by necessity, rather than to deprive the atoms of their natural motions. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 10.23 | |
| A reaction: The 'deprivation' would have to be caused by mind, or by the later 'swerve' of Epicurus. |
| 4170 | Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Man's action have been interpreted as free, which they are not, for every individual action follows with strict necessity from the impact of motive on character. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 023) | |
| A reaction: If 'character is fate' (Heraclitus) then presumably motive must also be fate to complete the determinist picture. I shall spend the next year redesigning my motivation. |
| 24041 | Democritus says spherical atoms are fire, and constitute the soul [psuche] [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democritus says the soul is a sort of fire. For the shapes and atoms are unlimitied and those that are spherical he says are fire and soul - which are like the motes in the air when sunbeams come through the window. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], DK 67-68) by Aristotle - De Anima 403b31 | |
| A reaction: It's hard to see why the spherical atoms should be fire. Maybe because they move together quickly and easily. …At 404a5 Aristotle agrees with me! |
| 20913 | Democritus says the soul is the body, and thinking is thus the mixture of the body [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
| Full Idea: Democritus explains thinking by the mixture of the body, which is surely in accordance with his reasoning, since he makes the soul the body. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A135) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 58 | |
| A reaction: I agree with Democritus. |
| 4169 | Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 018) | |
| A reaction: The word 'act' seems to beg the question (as does 'true'!). I am no longer sure that I know what an act of will is. Hobbes says there is no such thing. |
| 7187 | Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Schopenhauer's interpretation of the in-itself as will was an essential step: but he didn't know how to deify the will, and remained caught in the moral, Christian ideal | |
| From: comment on Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Writings from Late Notebooks 9[42] | |
| A reaction: Intriguingly, this seems to suggest that Nietzsche consciously sought to replace the absence of God with the human will, which strikes me as an odd, and very nineteenth century, idea. Loss of religion bothered them a lot. |
| 21365 | Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Only the will is thing-in-itself. ...It appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and also in the deliberate conduct of man, and the great difference between the two concerns only the degree of the manifestation. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 110), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will' | |
| A reaction: If will acts 'blindly' in forces of nature, then these seems to be the same concept as Nietzsche's 'will to power'. This seems to be heading towards Heidegger's Dasein, as a central and distinctive mode of being. |
| 1540 | Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: The guides to what is good and bad for people are pleasure and pain. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B188), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.46 |
| 4173 | If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: If, as all philosophers imagine, the intellect is our actual nature and the will is arrived at through knowledge, then only the motive from which we imagined we were acting would decide our moral worth. Imagined and true motive would be indistinguishable. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II Supp) | |
| A reaction: A nice argument. If motive is morally decisive, it is certainly crucial to decide between real and imagined motive (especially since Freud). But uncontrollable motive seems morally irrelevant. |
| 21370 | Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
| Full Idea: Schopenhauer belongs to a tradition which equates aesthetic experience with a 'disinterested' attitude towards its object, and is often cited as one of the chief proponents of such a view. | |
| From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic' | |
| A reaction: 'Disinterested' is quite a nice word for one's attitude to art, though you then have to capture why you are also involved in it. |
| 4182 | A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: The momentary silencing of all volition …is one of the principal elements in our pleasure in the beautiful. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65) | |
| A reaction: Iris Murdoch sees moral value in beauty, because it overrides selfishness. The perception of beauty is certainly something deeper than just another nice feeling. There is a cognitive element to it. |
| 21928 | The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| Full Idea: Exaltation of the Sublime is the struggle to maintain will-less knowing in the face of a threat to the human will. The Sublime contains an awful beauty and a delightful terror because it includes a threat to human existence. | |
| From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 201-7) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 5 | |
| A reaction: Can you experience the Sublime when looking down a microscope? Can a mere theory in cosmology be sublime? Can a supposed perception of the Sublime ever be incorrect? We no longer worry about these questions, it seems. |
| 21927 | Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| Full Idea: The emphasis on the presentation of Platonic Ideas distinguishes Schopenhauer's theory of art from standard Romantic theories, which emphasize the expression of emotion and feeling. | |
| From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 5 | |
| A reaction: Theories of art that neglect ideas, even if subliminally expressed, have gone badly wrong. |
| 8116 | The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner] |
| Full Idea: For Schopenhauer, the point of art lies in the metaphysical liberation from selfhood that will-less aesthetic contemplation induces. | |
| From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 3.6.3 | |
| A reaction: I've never understood why anyone (Buddhists included) would want 'liberation from selfhood'. Certainly art can make us forget ourselves in a more objective view of things, but science can do that too. |
| 4174 | Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], III 41) | |
| A reaction: A bit of a shock, because it implies human vanity, but it fits the best works of art rather well. What else reveals humanity's beauty? Beautiful deeds must be recorded. |
| 21380 | The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Nothing else can be stated as the aim of our existence except the knowledge that it would be better for us not to exist. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 605), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 8 'Denial' | |
| A reaction: Nonsense on stilts. Nietzsche rebelled against this. If there is such 'knowledge' then it obviously has nothing to do with the aim of our existence. It is just a rejection of aims. The aim is making the best of existence, not spurning it. |
| 21374 | We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: We should be just as foolish to expect that our moral systems and ethics would create virtuous, noble and hold men, as that our aesthetics would produce poets, painterd and musicians. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 271), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against' | |
| A reaction: Presumably the aim of ethical theory is to understand the truths about ethics. That can't do any harm, can it? In every other area of life we think that understanding leads to improvement. Unless, of course, there are no truths of ethics.... |
| 4181 | Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65) | |
| A reaction: A nice way of stating the core of moral relativism. To me, though, it just seems a rejection of morality. Conflicting wills bring moral paralysis. Might is right. |
| 5649 | Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Since for Schopenhauer will has no intrinsic end, but breaks through all its temporary fulfilments and casts them aside as irrelevant once attained, it becomes impossible to assert that there is any ultimate aim to human activity. | |
| From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.13 | |
| A reaction: This sums up part of the modern anti-teleological view of life, with its notion of purposes which can only arise out of consciousnesses. Such a view leaves untouched the key question, which is "What should I will?" |
| 495 | Wisdom creates a healthy passion-free soul [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Medicine heals diseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul from passions. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B031), quoted by Clement - Pedagogue 1.6.2.1 | |
| A reaction: The interesting concept of a healthy mind seems to have got lost in modern moral philosophy. |
| 4177 | Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Perhaps no one at the end of his life, if he gives the matter sober consideration and is, at the same time, frank, ever wishes to live it over again; he more readily chooses non-existence. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59) | |
| A reaction: Hence Nietzsche's doctrine of 'eternal return' (Gay Science §341, idea 2936). From Schopenhauer it is just bleak pessimism, but from Nietzsche it is a wonderful challenge to live, perhaps the best ever. |
| 4185 | Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: If we observe an altruistic action the simplest explanation and the essential character of the person's conduct is that they make less distinction than is usually made between themselves and others. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66) | |
| A reaction: Obvious, really, but Schopenhauer is talking about the will. Is the effacement of the Self desirable, apart from the benefit it might bring to other people. I don't find it appealing. |
| 4183 | Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: A theory of morals which motivates can only do so by working on self-love, but what springs from this latter has no moral worth. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66) | |
| A reaction: I just don't believe this pessimism. Schopenhauer was an incipient social darwinist who needed a course in modern game theory. Or he just needed to be a nicer man. |
| 1537 | Happiness is identifying and separating the pleasures [Democritus, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Democritus thinks that happiness consists in the determination and separation of pleasures, and that this is what is both finest and most beneficial for people. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A167) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.07.3 | |
| A reaction: A great deal of the strategy and ethics of living consists (if you are lucky) of discriminating among possible pleasures. Philosophers should produce criteria. |
| 4172 | Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: We are fortunate if we keep up the game whereby desire passes into satisfaction, and satisfaction into new desire - if the pace of this is swift, it is called happiness, and if it is slow, sorrow. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 029) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the dream of the addict, as Socrates points out with his example of the leaky jar in 'Gorgias'. Should we want more desires? |
| 21371 | We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: So long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we never attain lasting happiness or peace. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 196), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic' | |
| A reaction: I hate this idea. It obviously leads to his Buddhism, and the eastern idea that life is generally a bad idea and to be avoided. I think Nietzsche rebelled strongly against this attitude of Schopenhauer's. |
| 4184 | Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Virtue must spring from that intuitive knowledge which recognises in the individuality of others the same essence as in our own. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66) | |
| A reaction: After all his pessimism, he arrives at a view similar to Hume's, that morality is built on natural empathy. But why built a moral theory on one base. Everything points us towards morality! Moral actions are more beautiful. |
| 20917 | Contentment comes from moderation and proportion in life [Democritus, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Contentment [euthumia] comes about for human beings from the moderation of enjoyment and proportion [summetria] in life. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B191) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.1.210 | |
| A reaction: This is close to Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean. The majority of ethical ideas attributed to Democritus (presumably by the Epicureans) are thought to be spurious. This idea actually sounds rather stoic. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 13551 | Democritus says wealth is a burden to the virtuous mind [Democritus, by Seneca] |
| Full Idea: Democritus rejected wealth, regarding it as a burden to the virtuous mind. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Seneca the Younger - On Providence §6 | |
| A reaction: The rival view is that wealth empowers a virtuous person to perform more fine deeds. Democritus seems to have a rather solitary view of virtue. |
| 4179 | The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: The essence of nature is the will to life itself. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.60) | |
| A reaction: How would he have responded to Darwin? The will to life is the product, there, of a different and more remote force, such as the 'energy' of the physicist (whatever that is!). |
| 20899 | Atoms cling together, until a stronger necessity disperses them [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democritus thinks that the substances hold on to one another and remain together for a length of time until some stronger necessity arising from their surroundings shakes and disperses them. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A037) by Aristotle - On Democritus (frag) | |
| A reaction: [quoted in Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens] He's not wrong. This seems to provide a mechanism for the Heracltean flux. Ancient critics wanted to know where the 'stronger necessity' came from. |
| 20898 | Atoms are irregular, hooked, concave, convex, and many other shapes [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some substances are irregular, others hook-shaped, other concave, other convex, others provided with innumerable other differences. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A037) by Aristotle - On Democritus (frag) | |
| A reaction: [quoted in Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens] 'Substance' here means a fundamental object, which for Democritus is an undividable atom. |
| 20908 | There could be an atom the size of the world [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Democritus say that it is possible that there exists an atom of the size of the world. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A047) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.12.6 | |
| A reaction: The editor says this may have been a criticism of Democritus - presumably a reductio ad absurdum. But Democritus has no upper limit on the size of an atom. It challenges the imagination to treat such a huge thing as indivisible. |
| 1527 | There must be atoms, to avoid the absurdity of infinite division down to nothing [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If everything is infinitely divided, what survives the divisions? Alternatively, division would end at points with no magnitude, in which case bodies are composed of nothing. This is the argument claiming there are atoms of some magnitude. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A048b) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a14- |
| 493 | Experiences are merely convention; only atoms and the void are real [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Sweet exists by convention, bitter by convention, colour by convention; atoms and void alone exist in reality. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B009), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.135 |
| 20909 | The basic atoms are without qualities - which only arise from encounters between atoms [Democritus, by Galen] |
| Full Idea: Democritus and the Epicureans posit that the first element is without quality, possessing by nature neither whiteness, blackness, sweetness or bitterness, warmth or cold. ...It is from the encounter of the atoms that all the sensible qualities come about. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A049) by Galen - On Hippocrates and Plato 1.2 | |
| A reaction: Idea 493 comes in the middle of this summary by Galen. Hence atoms play the role that substrates play in object-based metaphysics. So atoms have the same problem. Is the shape of an atom a quality of an atom. Or are qualities what atoms DO? |
| 1536 | If a cone is horizontally sliced the surfaces can't be equal, so it goes up in steps [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: If a cone is cut parallel to the base are the two new surfaces equal or unequal? If they are unequal, the cone must have gone up in steps. If they are equal then the cone must have been a cylinder, which is absurd. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B155), quoted by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1079e1 |
| 17542 | 'Full' and 'Void' secularised Parmenides's Being and Not-being [Democritus, by Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: In atomism, the antithesis of Being and Not-being of Parmenides is secularised into the antithesis of the 'Full' and the 'Void'. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Werner Heisenberg - Physics and Philosophy 04 |
| 1525 | Atomists say there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democritus and Leucippus say that there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b15 |
| 5947 | If only atoms are real and the rest is convention, we wouldn't bother to avoid pain [Democritus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
| Full Idea: Democritus erred when he said that the atoms alone exist in truth among realities, but everything else is convention; for then, far from discovering the truth, we shall not even be able to live, since we shall avoid neither fire nor wounds. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Diogenes (Oen) - fragments/reports F2 7 | |
| A reaction: The point is that we have to treat pain as a reality, not just as a convention. I suspect that Diogenes is making the same mistake made by modern attackers of 'eliminativism'. It is all about identity and reduction and levels of reality… |
| 13219 | When atoms touch, why don't they coalesce, like water drops? [Aristotle on Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Why, when they come into contact, do they [atoms] not coalesce into one, as drops of water run together when drop touches drop? | |
| From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 326a33 | |
| A reaction: Presumably we must think of atoms as having basic ontological unity, rather than as being little globules of 'stuff'. They are more like monads than they are like mud. |
| 1533 | Because appearance is infinitely varied, atomists assume infinitely many shapes of atom [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: They thought that truth lay in appearances, which they appreciated are contradictory and infinite, so they made the shapes of atoms infinite. Thus the infinite changes in compounds create the infinitely varies appearances. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A009) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 315b9 |
| 23314 | Greeks explained regularity by intellectual design, not by laws [Democritus, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: It is clear that Democritus had no idea of laws of nature …for in Greek thought regularity of behaviour is associated with design by an intellect. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Michael Frede - A Free Will Intro | |
| A reaction: Ah. A simple realisation…! Seventeenth century laws of nature offered an explanation of natural order which didn't rely on God. Even though those scientists were all theists. |
| 24059 | Democritus is wrong: in a void we wouldn't see a distant ant in exact detail [Aristotle on Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Democritus did not speak correctly in supposing that if the intermediate space became a void, we would see an ant in exact detail if it were up in the heaven. …If the intermediate space became a void, rather nothing would be seen at all. | |
| From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - De Anima 419a15 | |
| A reaction: Depends what you mean by void, but Aristotle is nearer the truth. Is vision clearer in outer space than in our higher atmosphere? |
| 5101 | Movement is impossible in a void, because nothing can decide the direction of movement [Aristotle on Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Void makes it impossible for anything to move, since in a void there is nowhere for a thing to move to more or less than anywhere else, because the void by definition contains no differentiation. | |
| From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 214b32 | |
| A reaction: A lovely application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. However this assumes that the cause of the movement is going to be in the void (telos?), rather than in the body which will move (modern causation?). |
| 20905 | Growth and movement would not exist if there were no void to receive them [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: They say that one argument for void is that otherwise local motion (that is, locomotion and growth) would not exist: for there would not seem to be motion if there were no void, for what is full is incapable of receiving anything. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A019), quoted by Aristotle - Physics 213b03 | |
| A reaction: The modern concept of a 'field' seems to have removed the possibility of a genuine 'void'. |
| 20911 | There are unlimited worlds of varying sizes, some without life or water [Democritus, by Hippolytus] |
| Full Idea: Democritus says that there exist unlimited worlds and that they are different in magnitude. ...Some worlds are devoid of animals and plants and of all humidity. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A010, A040) by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 1.12,13.2-4 | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear why Democritus came up with the idea of the Multicosmos. I don't suppose he meant the moon or planets, but another Cosmos. |
| 1535 | Democritus said people imagined gods as the source of what awed or frightened them [Democritus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Democritus thought that people imagined gods as responsible for the frightening and awesome things that happen in this world. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A075) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.24 |
| 4178 | Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: Let no one think that Christianity is conducive to optimism; on the contrary, in the Gospels 'world' and 'evil' are used almost synonymously. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59) | |
| A reaction: The source of Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil'. Do any religions throw you vigorously back into the middle of life, with its conflict and creativity? |
| 4180 | Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: All systems of religion are the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.63) | |
| A reaction: Is this a compliment? It seems to be, because at least the mysteries are identified and given an outward form. A nice thought. |
| 20915 | The soul is destroyed with the body [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Democritus says the soul is destructible, and is destroyed together with the whole body. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A109) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 4.7.4 | |
| A reaction: This is the only belief possible for Democritus, since everything, including life and soul, is just the confluence of atoms, and they are regularly dispersed. This is the epitome of materialist philosophy. |