Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'On the Elements of Being: I' and 'On the Genealogy of Ethics'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
Early Greeks cared about city and companions; later Greeks concentrated on the self [Foucault]
     Full Idea: For early Greeks their techné for life was to take care of the city, of companions (see Plato's 'Alcibiades'). Taking care of yourself for its own sake starts with the Epicureans, and becomes very general in Seneca and Pliny.
     From: Michel Foucault (On the Genealogy of Ethics [1983], p.260)
     A reaction: In Aristotle the two strike me as ideally balanced - to become a wonderful citizen by looking after yourself. Presumably the destruction of the city-states by Alexander took away the motive, and the aim became more private.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC]
     Full Idea: 'Socrates is wise' means that the concurrence sum (Socrates) includes a trope which is a member of the similarity set (Wisdom).
     From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.119)
     A reaction: Resemblance has to be taken as a basic (and presumably unanalysable) concept, which invites Russell's objection (Idea 4441).
A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC]
     Full Idea: I shall divert the word 'trope' to stand for the abstract particular which is, so to speak, the occurrence of an essence.
     From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.115)
     A reaction: Thus tropes entered philosophical discussion. Presumably the precedent for an 'abstract particular' would be a particular occurrence of the number 7.
A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC]
     Full Idea: Any possible world, and hence, of course, this one, is completely constituted by its tropes and connections of location and similarity.
     From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.116)
     A reaction: Note that Williams regularly referred to possible worlds in 1953. This is a full-blooded trope theory, which asserts that objects are bundles of tropes, so that both particulars and universals are ontologically taken care of.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Why couldn't a person's life become a work of art? [Foucault]
     Full Idea: Couldn't everyone's life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life?
     From: Michel Foucault (On the Genealogy of Ethics [1983], p.261)
     A reaction: This sounds wonderfully appealing until I try to think how I would implement it. The Augustine move, from sinner to saint, is a possibility, but there is nothing good about sin. The Christian ideal, of colossal self-sacrifice, can be very heroic.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Greeks and early Christians were much more concerned about food than about sex [Foucault]
     Full Idea: It is interesting to see the very slow move from the privileging of food, which was overwhelming in Greece, to interest in sex. Early Christians (and rules for monks) were more concerned with food. Sex only dominates from the seventeenth century.
     From: Michel Foucault (On the Genealogy of Ethics [1983], p.253)
     A reaction: Certainly the Greeks were obsessed with food, and the Sicilian Greeks were notorious for their love of it. Is it simply that food becomes more plentiful, or does female freedom lead to more sex? Puritanism hates the greatest pleasures the most.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').