Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'On the Elements of Being: I' and 'Rationality and Goodness'

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5 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes

8510	'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC]
	Full Idea: 'Socrates is wise' means that the concurrence sum (Socrates) includes a trope which is a member of the similarity set (Wisdom).
	From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.119)
	A reaction: Resemblance has to be taken as a basic (and presumably unanalysable) concept, which invites Russell's objection (Idea 4441).

8508	A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC]
	Full Idea: I shall divert the word 'trope' to stand for the abstract particular which is, so to speak, the occurrence of an essence.
	From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.115)
	A reaction: Thus tropes entered philosophical discussion. Presumably the precedent for an 'abstract particular' would be a particular occurrence of the number 7.

8509	A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC]
	Full Idea: Any possible world, and hence, of course, this one, is completely constituted by its tropes and connections of location and similarity.
	From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.116)
	A reaction: Note that Williams regularly referred to possible worlds in 1953. This is a full-blooded trope theory, which asserts that objects are bundles of tropes, so that both particulars and universals are ontologically taken care of.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique

23692	Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions [Foot]
	Full Idea: Some philosophers insist that dispositions, motives and other 'internal' elements are the primary determinants of moral goodness and badness. I have never been a 'virtue ethicist' is this sense. For me it is what is done that stands in this position.
	From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Goodness [2004], p.2), quoted by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 4 'Virtue'
	A reaction: [She mentions Hursthouse, Slote, Swanton] I'm quite struck by this. Aristotle insists that morality concerns actions. It doesn't seem that a person could be a saint by having wonderful dispositions, but doing nothing. Paraplegics?

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').