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14212
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A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
A consistent theory is, by definition, one satisfied by some model; an isomorphic image of a model satisfies the same theories as the original model; to provide the making of an isomorphic image of any given model, a domain need only be large enough.
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Model')
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A reaction:
This is laying out the ground for Putnam's model theory argument in favour of anti-realism. If you are chasing the one true model of reality, then formal model theory doesn't seem to offer much encouragement.
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14213
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Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
Anti-realists say the only world is imaginary, or only has the parts or classes or relations we divide it into, or doubt that reference to the world is possible, or doubt that our interpretations can achieve truth.
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Anti-R')
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A reaction:
[compression of a paragraph on anti-realism] Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. A nice example of the rhetorical device of ridiculing an opponent by suggesting that they don't even know what they themselves believe.
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14210
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A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints of nature.
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Might')
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A reaction:
In that case they do, but if there are no atoms at the root of physics then presumably their could also be thoroughly jointless assemblages, involving probability distributions etc. Even random scattered atoms seem rather short of joints.
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4983
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There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
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Full Idea:
We know too much about thought and behaviour to trust exact and universal statements linking them. Beliefs and desires issue in behaviour only as modified and mediated by further beliefs and desires, attitudes and attendings, without limit.
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From:
Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970], p.217)
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A reaction:
Now seen as a key objection to behaviourism, and rightly so. However, I am not sure about "without limit", which implies an implausible absolute metaphysical freedom. Davidson goes too far in denying any nomological link between thought and brain.
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5497
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Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
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Full Idea:
For Davidson, mental types are individuated by considerations that are nonscientific, distinctly humanistic, and part normative, so will not coincide with any types that are designated in scientific terms.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.8
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A reaction:
I just don't believe this, mainly because I don't accept that there is a category called 'nonscientific'. All we are saying is that a brain is a hugely complicated object, and we don't properly understand its operations, though we relate to it very well.
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2321
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If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
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Full Idea:
Davidson takes mental anomalism (that the mind exhibits normativity and rationality), and in particular his claim that there are no laws connecting mental and physical properties, to undermine mind-body reductionism.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Mind in a Physical World §4 p.092
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A reaction:
A nice summary of the core idea of property dualism. Personally I expect the whole lot to be reducible, and to follow laws, but the sheer complexity of the brain permanently bars us from actually doing the reduction.
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3404
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Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
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Full Idea:
Davidson's thesis is that if mental events of a particular kind cause physical events of a particular kind, and the two kinds are connected by a law, then they must both be physical kinds.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.137
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A reaction:
Davidson would pretty obviously be right. The whole problem here is the idea of a 'law'. You can only have strict law for simple entities, like particles and natural kinds. The brain is a mess, like weather or explosions.
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6620
|
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
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Full Idea:
Davidson's version of the identity theory is couched in terms of events rather than states, because he regards causation as a relation between events.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.2 n12
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A reaction:
I think it may be more to the point that the mind is a dynamic thing, and so it consists of events rather than states, and hence we want to know what those events are made up from. I think my chair is causing me to rest above the floor…
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14209
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Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families].
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc')
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A reaction:
(The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference.
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7903
|
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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