Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Freedom to Act' and 'works'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: The idea that there should be something like a distinction of levels among properties is captured in Ramsey's 'simple theory of types'.
     From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (works [1928]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell
     A reaction: I merely report this, though it is not immediately obvious how anyone would decide which 'level' a type belonged on.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: Beliefs are maps by which we steer.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (works [1928]), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind p.259 n5
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta]
     Full Idea: A 'deviant causal chain' is when an agent has a reason for performing an action, and for the reason to cause the performance, without that being the reason for which the agent performed it.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Freedom to Act [1973]) by Ram Neta - The Basing Relation II
     A reaction: Davidson's thesis is that 'reasons are causes'. This was a problem he faced. I think this discussion is now obscured by the complex and multi-layered account of action which is emerging from neuroscience.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').