6 ideas
12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington] |
Full Idea: In my view, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], Abs) | |
A reaction: My immediate reaction is that epistemic necessity is not necessity at all. 'For all I know' 2 plus 2 might really be 95, and squares may also be circular. |
12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical necessity derives from distinguishing things which can happen and things which can't, in virtue of their nature, which we discover empirically: the metaphysically possible, I claim, is constrained by the laws of nature. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I) | |
A reaction: She claims that Kripke is sympathetic to this. Personally I like the idea that natural necessity is metaphysically necessary (see 'Scientific Essentialism'), but the other way round comes as a bit of a surprise. I will think about it. |
12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington] |
Full Idea: So-called broadly logical necessity (by which I mean, not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I) | |
A reaction: This is controversial, and is criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. Fine argues that 'narrow' (formal) logical necessity is metaphysical. Between them they have got rid of logical necessity completely. |
12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington] |
Full Idea: Validity is governed by epistemic necessity, i.e. an argument is valid if and only if there is an a priori route from premises to conclusion. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §V) | |
A reaction: Controversial, and criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. I don't think I agree with her. I don't see validity as depending on dim little human beings. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
21132 | Domination is probable obedience by some group of persons [Weber] |
Full Idea: Domination is the probability that a command with a specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons. | |
From: Max Weber (Economy and Society [1919], p.53), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 06 | |
A reaction: Said to be an 'influential definition'. In principle you might have no domination, but be regularly obeyed because your commands were so acceptable to a very independent-minded group of people. That said, good definition! |