Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Contextualism Contested' and 'works'

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4 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee]
     Full Idea: The fact that different standards are routinely applied in making an evaluative judgement does not imply the correctness of semantic contextualism about the contents of judgements. ..We can't infer different truth conditions from differing standards.
     From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested [2005], p.51)
     A reaction: This is the basic objection to contextualism from the 'invariantist' camp, which says there are facts about good judgement and justification, despite contextual shifts. My sympathies are with the contextualists (on this one).
Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee]
     Full Idea: Maybe every issue about knowledge (Gettier problem, scientific knowledge, justification, scepticism) has been discussed solely in the single 'really and truly' context.
     From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested [2005], p.53)
     A reaction: This seems not to be true, if we contrast Descartes' desire for total certainty with Peirce's fallibilism. It seems to me that modern philosophy has deliberately relaxed the standard, in order to make some sort of knowledge possible. Cf. Idea 12894.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage is not a virtue, but the form of every virtue at its testing point [Lewis,CS]
     Full Idea: Courage is not simply one of the virtues, but the form of every virtue at the testing point.
     From: C.S. Lewis (works [1950])
     A reaction: This appeared on Twitter, without mention of its source. Adding it breaks my normal rules, but I hope you agree that it is too good to miss. Is not even resolutely facing up to suffering or death a case of genuine courage? Determination, prioritisation?