Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Contextualism Contested' and 'The Logical Syntax of Language'

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence

13342	Carnap defined consequence by contradiction, but this is unintuitive and changes with substitution [Tarski on Carnap]
	Full Idea: Carnap proposed to define consequence as 'sentence X follows from the sentences K iff the sentences K and the negation of X are contradictory', but 1) this is intuitively impossible, and 2) consequence would be changed by substituting objects.
	From: comment on Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language [1934], p.88-) by Alfred Tarski - The Concept of Logical Consequence p.414
	A reaction: This seems to be the first step in the ongoing explicit discussion of the nature of logical consequence, which is now seen by many as the central concept of logic. Tarski brings his new tool of 'satisfaction' to bear.

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention

13251	Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax [Carnap]
	Full Idea: In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build his own logic, i.e. his own form of language. All that is required is that he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments.
	From: Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language [1934], §17), quoted by JC Beall / G Restall - Logical Pluralism 7.3
	A reaction: This is understandable, but strikes me as close to daft relativism. If I specify a silly logic, I presume its silliness will be obvious. By what criteria? I say the world dictates the true logic, but this is a minority view.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism

12890	That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee]
	Full Idea: The fact that different standards are routinely applied in making an evaluative judgement does not imply the correctness of semantic contextualism about the contents of judgements. ..We can't infer different truth conditions from differing standards.
	From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested [2005], p.51)
	A reaction: This is the basic objection to contextualism from the 'invariantist' camp, which says there are facts about good judgement and justification, despite contextual shifts. My sympathies are with the contextualists (on this one).

12892	Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee]
	Full Idea: Maybe every issue about knowledge (Gettier problem, scientific knowledge, justification, scepticism) has been discussed solely in the single 'really and truly' context.
	From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested [2005], p.53)
	A reaction: This seems not to be true, if we contrast Descartes' desire for total certainty with Peirce's fallibilism. It seems to me that modern philosophy has deliberately relaxed the standard, in order to make some sort of knowledge possible. Cf. Idea 12894.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').