Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Formal and Transcendental Logic' and 'Nietzsche's Immoralism'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: Husserl maintained that because most logicians have not studied the connection between logic and the world, logic did not achieve its status of purity. Even more, their logic implicitly presupposed a world.
     From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1
     A reaction: The point here is that the bracketing of phenomenology, to reach an understanding with no presuppositions, is impossible if you don't realise what your are presupposing. I think the logic/world relationship is badly neglected, thanks to Frege.
Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: The phenomenological logic grounds logical notions in subjective acts of experience.
     From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929], p.183) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1
     A reaction: I'll approach this with great caution, but this is a line of thought that appeals to me. The core assumptions of logic do not arise ex nihilo.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: Pure mathematics is the science of the relations between any object whatever (relation of whole to part, relation of equality, property, unity etc.). In this sense, pure mathematics is seen by Husserl as formal ontology.
     From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.2
     A reaction: I would expect most modern analytic philosophers to agree with this. Modern mathematics (e.g. category theory) seems to have moved beyond this stage, but I still like this idea.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot]
     Full Idea: Moral, as opposed to aesthetic, evaluation does require some distinction between actions for which we are responsible and those for which we are not responsible.
     From: Philippa Foot (Nietzsche's Immoralism [1991], p.154)
     A reaction: It is hard to disagree with this, but difficult to give a precise account of responsibility, probably because it is not an all-or-nothing matter. If we accept responsibility for our controlled actions, why not for our considered aesthetic judgements?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot]
     Full Idea: I wonder whether the practice of justice may not absolutely require a certain recognition of equality between human beings, not a pretence of the equality of talents, but something deeper.
     From: Philippa Foot (Nietzsche's Immoralism [1991], p.152)
     A reaction: {My 'something deeper' is expressed by Foot in a quotation from Gertrude Stein]. This may well be the most fundamental division which runs across a society - between those who accept and those reject human equality.