Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' and 'Structuralism'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


4 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Structuralism is now common, studying relations, with no regard for what the objects might be [Hellman]
     Full Idea: With developments in modern mathematics, structuralist ideas have become commonplace. We study 'abstract structures', having relations without regard to the objects. As Hilbert famously said, items of furniture would do.
     From: Geoffrey Hellman (Structuralism [2007], §1)
     A reaction: Hilbert is known as a Formalist, which suggests that modern Structuralism is a refined and more naturalist version of the rather austere formalist view. Presumably the sofa can't stand for six, so a structural definition of numbers is needed.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Maybe mathematical objects only have structural roles, and no intrinsic nature [Hellman]
     Full Idea: There is the tantalizing possibility that perhaps mathematical objects 'have no nature' at all, beyond their 'structural role'.
     From: Geoffrey Hellman (Structuralism [2007], §1)
     A reaction: This would fit with a number being a function rather than an object. We are interested in what cars do, not the bolts that hold them together? But the ontology of mathematics is quite separate from how you do mathematics.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Being a true justified belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge [Gettier]
     Full Idea: The claim that someone knows a proposition if it is true, it is believed, and the person is justified in their belief is false, in that the conditions do not state a sufficient condition for the claim.
     From: Edmund L. Gettier (Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? [1963], p.145)
     A reaction: This is the beginning of the famous Gettier Problem, which has motivated most epistemology for the last forty years. Gettier implies that justification is necessary, even if it is not sufficient. He gives two counterexamples.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').