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All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics' and 'works'

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11 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
     Full Idea: There are four 'perfect syllogisms': Barbara (every M is P, every S is M, so every S is P); Celarent (no M is P, every S is M, so no S is P); Darii (every M is P, some S is M, so some S is P); Ferio (no M is P, some S is M, so some S is not P).
     From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], 8)
     A reaction: The four names are mnemonics from medieval universities.
Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
     Full Idea: It has often been claimed (e.g. by Leibniz) that a single rule governs all syllogistic validity, called 'dictum de omni et null', which says that what is affirmed or denied of any whole is affirmed or denied of any part of that whole.
     From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], 8)
     A reaction: This seems to be the rule which is captured by Venn Diagrams.
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
     Full Idea: Three common kinds of sentence cannot be put into syllogistic ('categorical') form: ones using singular terms ('Mars is red'), ones using relational terms ('every painter owns some brushes'), and compound sentences.
     From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], 8)
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
     Full Idea: Term logic begins with expressions and two 'term functors'. Any simple letter is a 'term', any term prefixed by a minus ('-') is a 'negative term', and any pair of terms flanking a plus ('+') is a 'compound term'. Parenthese are used for grouping.
     From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], 8)
     A reaction: [see Engelbretsen and Sayward for the full formal system]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
     Full Idea: One of the key ideas of modern formal logic is that all formally valid inferences can be specified in strictly syntactic terms.
     From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], Ch.2)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
     Full Idea: Classical logic rests on the concepts of truth and falsity (and usually makes use of a semantic theory based on models), whereas constructivist logic accounts for inference in terms of defense and refutation.
     From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], Intro)
     A reaction: My instincts go with the classical view, which is that inferences do not depend on the human capacity to defend them, but sit there awaiting revelation. My view isn't platonist, because I take the inferences to be rooted in the physical world.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
     Full Idea: Unlike ∨, →, ↔, and ∀, the sign = is not eliminable from a logic.
     From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], Ch.3)
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
     Full Idea: A set of axioms is said to be ω-incomplete if, for some universal quantification, each of its instances is derivable from those axioms but the quantification is not thus derivable.
     From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], 7)
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: On Suarez's account, only natural kinds and their members have real essences.
     From: report of Francisco Suárez (works [1588]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.3.1 n21
     A reaction: Interesting. Rather than say that everything is a member of some kind, we leave quirky individuals out, with no essence at all. What is the status of the very first exemplar of a given kind?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley]
     Full Idea: The 'influx' model of causation says that causes involve a process of contagion, as it were; when the kettle boils, the gas infects the water inside the kettle with its own 'individual accident' of heat, which literally flows from one to the other.
     From: report of Francisco Suárez (works [1588]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Ch.2
     A reaction: This nicely captures the scholastic target of Hume's sceptical thinking on the subject. However, see Idea 2542, where the idea of influx has had a revival. It is hard to see how the water could change if it didn't 'catch' something from the gas.