Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Handbook [Encheiridion]' and 'fragments/reports'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, theology [Cleanthes, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cleanthes says there are six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, and theology.
     From: report of Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.41
     A reaction: This was a minority view, as most stoics agreed with Zeno and Chrysippus that there are three main topics. Nowadays there is little discussion of the 'parts' of philosophy, but the recent revival of meta-philosophy should encourage it.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Bodies interact with other bodies, and cuts cause pain, and shame causes blushing, so the soul is a body [Cleanthes, by Nemesius]
     Full Idea: Cleanthes says no incorporeal interacts with a body, but one body interacts with another body; the soul interacts with the body when it is sick and being cut, and the body feels shame and fear, and turns red or pale, so the soul is a body.
     From: report of Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by Nemesius - De Natura Hominis 78,7
     A reaction: This is precisely the interaction problem with dualism, or, as we might now say, the problem of mental causation. The standard Stoic view is that the soul is a sort of rarefied fire, which disperses at death.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The soul suffers when the body hurts, creates redness from shame, and pallor from fear [Cleanthes]
     Full Idea: Nothing incorporeal shares an experience with a body …but the soul suffers with the body when it is ill and when it is cut, and the body suffers with the soul - when the soul is ashamed the body turns red, and pale when the soul is frightened.
     From: Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]), quoted by Nemesius - De Natura Hominis 2
     A reaction: Aha - my favourite example of the corporeal nature of the mind - blushing! It is the conscious content of the thought which brings blood to the cheeks.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: The will of nature may be learned from those things in which we do not differ from one another.
     From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 26)
     A reaction: There you go! This is the rule for anthropologists on field trips. And it guides us towards a core of essential human nature. But it neglects the way that nature is expressed in different cultures, which is also important.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: The injunction of Epictetus is well known, that in commiserating with another for his misfortune, we ought to talk consolingly, but not be moved by pity.
     From: report of Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], §16) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §15.1
     A reaction: This goes strongly against the grain of the Christian tradition, but strikes me as an appealing attitude (even if I am the sufferer).
If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: When you see someone weeping is sorrow …do not shrink from sympathising with him, and even groaning with him, but be careful not to groan inwardly too.
     From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 16)
     A reaction: The point is that the person's suffering is an 'indifferent' because nothing can be done about it, and we should only really care about what we are able to choose. He is not opposed to the man's suffering, or his need for support.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: The governor Agrippinus would try to persuade those whom he sentenced that it was proper for them to be sentenced, …just as the physician persuades a patient to accept their treatment.
     From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 22)
     A reaction: This resembles the Contractualism of T.H. Scanlon (that actions are good if you can justify them to those involved). It may be possible to persuade people by the use of sophistry and lies. Nevertheless, a fairly civilise proposal.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The ascending scale of living creatures requires a perfect being [Cleanthes, by Tieleman]
     Full Idea: Cleanthes tried to prove the existence of God, arguing that the ascending scale of living creatures requires there to be a perfect being.
     From: report of Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Cleanthes
     A reaction: Not a very good argument. Even if you accept its basic claim, it is not clear what has to exist. A perfect tree? If the being transcends the physical (in order to achieve perfection), does it cease to be a 'being'?