Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Bacchae' and 'Causation'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Our ancient beliefs can never be overthrown by subtle arguments [Euripides]
     Full Idea: Teiresias: We have no use for theological subtleties./ The beliefs we have inherited, as old as time,/ Cannot be overthrown by any argument,/ Nor by the most inventive ingenuity.
     From: Euripides (The Bacchae [c.407 BCE], 201)
     A reaction: [trans. Philip Vellacott (Penguin)] Compare Idea 8243. While very conservative societies have amazing resilience in maintaining traditional beliefs, modern culture eats into them, not directly by argument, but by arguments at fifth remove.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford]
     Full Idea: Although not all explanations are causal, anything which can be explained in any way can be explained causally.
     From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.79)
     A reaction: A nice bold claim with which I am in sympathy, but he would have a struggle proving it. Does this imply that causal explanations are basic, or in some way superior? Note that functional explanations would thus have underlying causal explanations.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford]
     Full Idea: A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is jointly sufficient for it. This is a widely held but controversial view, and it is not a logical truth.
     From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.82)
     A reaction: This wouldn't work for an impossible occurrence. What are the necessary conditions to produce a large planet made of uranium? One of them would have to be a naturally impossible necessity.