Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'What Mary Didn't Know' and 'Improvement of Understanding'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

6 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
16541 All the intrinsic properties of a thing should be deducible from its definition [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: The definition of a thing should be such that all the properties of that thing, in so far as it is considered by itself, and not in conjunction with other things, can be deduced from it.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (Improvement of Understanding [1675], p.35), quoted by E.J. Lowe - What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? 6
     A reaction: This is exactly what Locke requires of a real essence (though he is pessimistic about ever achieving it). Spinoza is talking of an Aristotelian real definition, which may be complex, and not a lexicographer's short verbal explication.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
13073 To understand the properties we must know the essence, as with a circle [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: If a circle is defined as a figure in which lines from centre to circumference are equal, such definitions do not explain the essence of a circle, but only a property. The properties of a thing are not understood as long as their essences are not known.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (Improvement of Understanding [1675], §95), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.2.1
     A reaction: This is the traditional Aristotelian view of essence, and the example of a circle is nice, though I am not sure what the essence of a circle might be. Presumably ALL the properties of a circle must flow from it.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
4894 I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson]
     Full Idea: I say Mary knows an old fact in a new way, but I do not find a new bit of knowledge and a new fact.
     From: comment on Frank Jackson (What Mary Didn't Know [1986]) by John Perry - Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness §7.3
     A reaction: This seems roughly the right way to attack Jackson's 'knowledge argument', by asking exactly what he means by 'knowledge'. It is hard to see how 'qualia' can be both the means of acquiring knowledge, and the thing itself.
4895 Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson]
     Full Idea: Jackson seems to imply that it isn't fair that all physicalist knowledge can be written down, but not all dualist knowledge can be.
     From: comment on Frank Jackson (What Mary Didn't Know [1986]) by John Perry - Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness §7.5
     A reaction: This pinpoints a problem for the 'Mary' example - that Mary's new sight of colour is claimed as 'knowledge', and yet the whole point is that it cannot be expressed in propositions (which seems to leave it as 'procedural' or 'acquaintance' knowledge).
4886 Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson]
     Full Idea: Mary knows all the physical facts. ..It seems, however, that Mary does not know all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black and white room .. she will learn what it is like to see something red.
     From: Frank Jackson (What Mary Didn't Know [1986], §1.4)
     A reaction: Jackson is begging the question. A new physical event occurs when the red wavelength stimulates Mary's visual cortex for the first time. For an empiricist raw experience creates knowledge, so it can't BE knowledge. Does Mary acquire a new concept?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').