Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Conditionals' and 'Nonexistent Objects'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
There is an object for every set of properties (some of which exist, and others don't) [Parsons,T, by Sawyer]
     Full Idea: According to Terence Parsons, there is an object corresponding to every set of properties. To some of those sets of properties there corresponds an object that exists, and to others there corresponds an object that does not exist (a nonexistent object).
     From: report of Terence Parsons (Nonexistent Objects [1980]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 5
     A reaction: This I take to be the main source of the modern revival of Meinong's notorious view of objects (attacked by Russell). I always find the thought 'a round square is square' to be true, and in need of a truthmaker. But must a round square be non-triangular?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington]
     Full Idea: Jackson came to realise that there are assertable conditionals which one would not continue to believe if one learned the antecedent, such as Lewis's "If Reagan worked for the KGB, I'll never find out".
     From: report of Frank Jackson (Conditionals [1987]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.2
     A reaction: That pesky David Lewis made trouble for everybody. Edgington agrees that his earlier formulation (Idea 14288) holds good for nearly all cases. There is a self-referential element in Lewis's example.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').