24 ideas
2098 | The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In order to proceed from mathematics to physics the principle of sufficient reason is necessary, that nothing happens without there being a reason why it should be thus rather than otherwise. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], §2) |
3646 | There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Nothing happens without a sufficient reason why it should be thus rather than otherwise. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.2) |
2104 | No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is no possible reason which could limit the quantity of matter; therefore there cannot in fact be any such limitation. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.21) |
13430 | Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Infinity means that there are an infinity of distinguishable individuals, which is an empirical proposition. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §5) | |
A reaction: The Axiom sounds absurd, as a part of a logical system, but Ramsey ends up defending it. Logical tautologies, which seem to be obviously true, are rendered absurd if they don't refer to any objects, and some of them refer to infinities of objects. |
13428 | Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility asserted that to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [note: two functions are equivalent when the same arguments render them both true or both false]. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §2) | |
A reaction: Ramsey in the business of showing that this axiom from Russell and Whitehead is not needed. He says that the axiom seems to be needed for induction and for Dedekind cuts. Since the cuts rest on it, and it is weak, Ramsey says it must go. |
13427 | Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: In 'a = b' either 'a' and 'b' are names of the same thing, in which case the proposition says nothing, or of different things, in which case it is absurd. In neither case is it an assertion of a fact; it only asserts when a or b are descriptions. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §1) | |
A reaction: This is essentially Frege's problem with Hesperus and Phosphorus. How can identities be informative? So 2+2=4 is extensionally vacuous, but informative because they are different descriptions. |
13334 | Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: Group A consists of contradictions which would occur in a logical or mathematical system, involving terms such as class or number. Group B contradictions are not purely logical, and contain some reference to thought, language or symbolism. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], p.171), quoted by Graham Priest - The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference 1 | |
A reaction: This has become the orthodox division of all paradoxes, but the division is challenged by Priest (Idea 13373). He suggests that we now realise (post-Tarski?) that language is more involved in logic and mathematics than we thought. |
13426 | Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The formalists neglected the content altogether and made mathematics meaningless, but the logicians neglected the form and made mathematics consist of any true generalisations; only by taking account of both sides can we obtain an adequate theory. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §1) | |
A reaction: He says mathematics is 'tautological generalizations'. It is a criticism of modern structuralism that it overemphasises form, and fails to pay attention to the meaning of the concepts which stand at the 'nodes' of the structure. |
13425 | Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: The hopelessly inadequate formalist theory is, to some extent, the result of considering only the propositions of mathematics and neglecting the analysis of its concepts. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §1) | |
A reaction: You'll have to read Ramsey to see how this thought pans out, but it at least gives a pointer to how to go about addressing the question. |
19385 | All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: All simple substances will always have a harmony among themselves, because they always represent the same universe. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], V §91), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz | |
A reaction: We can accept that the universe itself does not contain contradictions (how could it), but it is a leap of faith to say that all monads represent the universe well enough to avoid contradictions. Maps can contradict one another. |
21346 | The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If the ratio of two lines L and M is conceived as abstracted from them both, without considering which is the subject and which the object, which will then be the subject? We cannot say both, for then we should have an accident in two subjects. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5th Paper, §47), quoted by John Heil - Relations 'External' | |
A reaction: [compressed] Leibniz is rejecting external relations as having any status in ontology. It looks like a mistake (originating in Aristotle) to try to shoehorn the ontology of relations into the substance-properties framework. |
22328 | I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: I can but put the evidence before me, and let it act on my mind. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], p.202), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 70 'Deg' | |
A reaction: Potter calls this observation 'downbeat', but I am an enthusiastic fan. It is roughly my view of both concept formation and of knowledge. You soak up the world, and respond appropriately. The trick is in the selection of evidence to confront. |
22325 | A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
Full Idea: I have always said that a belief was knowledge if it was 1) true, ii) certain, iii) obtained by a reliable process. | |
From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], p.258), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 66 'Rel' | |
A reaction: Not sure why it has to be 'certain' as well as 'true'. It seems that 'true' is objective, and 'certain' subjective. I think I know lots of things of which I am not fully certain. Reliabilism long preceded Alvin Goldman. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
2106 | The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: According to me there is nothing simple except true monads, which have no parts and no extensions. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5.24) |
2102 | Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are no two individuals indiscernible from one another - leaves, or drops of water, for example. This is an argument against atoms, which, like the void, are opposed to the principles of a true metaphysic. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.04) |
2105 | Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The least corpuscle is actually subdivided ad infinitum and contains a world of new created things, which this universe would lack if this corpuscle were an atom. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.PS) |
20965 | Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: In place of Descartes's conservation of 'quantity of motion', Leibniz upheld both the conservation of linear momentum and the conservation of kinetic energy. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5th paper) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 2 | |
A reaction: The point is that momentum involves velocity (which includes direction) rather than speed. Leibniz more or less invented the concept of 'energy' ('vis viva'). Papineau says these two leave no room for causation by mental substance. |
2103 | The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To say that God could cause the universe to move forward in a straight line or otherwise without changing it in any other way is another fanciful supposition. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.14) |
2100 | Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I have more than once stated that I held space to be something purely relative, like time. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.4) |
2107 | No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: How could a thing exist, no part of which ever exists? In the case of time, nothing exists but instants, and an instant is not even a part of time. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5.49) |
2101 | If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To ask why God did not make everything a year sooner would be reasonable if time were something apart from temporal things, but time is just the succession of things, which remains the same if the universe is created a year sooner. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.6) |
22894 | If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon] |
Full Idea: Leibniz argues that if time is a thing in itself, and God is 'in' time, then God would be dependent for His existence on the existence of time. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 3 'Newton' | |
A reaction: Hence Leibniz says time is merely relations between events. Not sure what he thinks an event is. What is God made of? Is there some divine matter upon which God's existence must depend? |
2099 | The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: By this principle alone, that there must be a sufficient reason why things are thus rather than otherwise, I prove the existence of the Divinity, and all the rest of metaphysics or natural theology. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], §2) |