6 ideas
| 21699 | Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory involved defining a term not by presenting a direct equivalent of it, but by 'paraphrasis', providing equivalents of the sentences. In this way, reference to fictitious objects can be simulated without our being committed to the objects. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Russell's Ontological Development [1966], p.75) | |
| A reaction: I hadn't quite grasped that the modern strategy of paraphrase tracks back to Russell - though it now looks obvious, thanks to Quine. Paraphrase is a beautiful way of sidestepping ontological problems. See Frege on the moons of Jupiter. |
| 3750 | "It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey] |
| Full Idea: It is evident that "It is true that Caesar was murdered" means no more than that Caesar was murdered. | |
| From: Frank P. Ramsey (Facts and Propositions [1927]) | |
| A reaction: At the very least, saying it is true adds emphasis. One sentence is about Caesar, the other about a proposal concerning Caesar, so they can't quite be the same. Note Frege's priority in making this suggestion. |
| 21700 | Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible [Quine] |
| Full Idea: The new freedom that Russell confers by paraphrasis (of definite descriptions) is our reward for recognising that the unit of communication is the sentence and not the word. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Russell's Ontological Development [1966], p.75) | |
| A reaction: Since many people hardly ever speak a properly formed sentence, I take propositions to be better candidates for this. However, I don't see how we can reject the compositional view (the meanings are assembled). |
| 21701 | Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it [Quine] |
| Full Idea: We can say that knowing words is knowing how to work out the meanings of sentences containing them. Dictionary definitions are mere clauses in a recursive definition of the meanings of sentences. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Russell's Ontological Development [1966], p.76) | |
| A reaction: Do you have to recursively define all the sentences that might contain the word, before you can fully know the meaning of the word? He seems to credit Russell with the holistic view of sentences (though I think that starts with Frege). |
| 18818 | Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey] |
| Full Idea: The meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead. | |
| From: Frank P. Ramsey (Facts and Propositions [1927], p.51), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought | |
| A reaction: I find this idea quite bizarre. Most sentences have no connection to any action or behavior at all. Do we have to ingeniously contrive some possible action? That is the worst sort of behaviourism. See context - Ramsey wasn't stupid! |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |