88 ideas
20262 | Don't use wisdom in order to become clever! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One ought not to use one's wisdom to become clever! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 308) | |
A reaction: And I would add 'don't think that being clever makes you wise'. Nietzsche, as always, is subtler than me (which is why I read him a lot). Presumably wisdom is broad, and cleverness is focused. Will becoming clever spoil someone's wisdom? |
20255 | Early 19th century German philosophers enjoyed concepts, rather than scientific explanations [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Early 19th century German philosophers retreated to the first and oldest level of speculation, for, like the thinkers of dreamy ages, they found satisfaction in concepts rather than in explanations - they resuscitated a prescientific type of philosophy. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 197) | |
A reaction: I have a suspicion that this may still apply to 'continental philosophy'. Personally I love explanations, which lead to understanding. But not all explanations are scientific. |
20260 | Carlyle spent his life vainly trying to make reason appear romantic [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Thomas Carlyle spent a long life trying to make reason romantic to his fellow Englishmen: to no avail! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 298) | |
A reaction: An interesting gloss on the shift from the Enlightenment to the Romantic era. Presumably the idea of the 'genius' and the 'hero' are the means whereby Carlyle hoped to achive this. |
20256 | What we think is totally dictated by the language available to express it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We have at every moment only that very thought for which we have ready to hand the words that are roughly capable of expressing it. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 257) | |
A reaction: This is a highly influential idea, even if this expression of it is little known. Everyone who places language at the centre of philosophy believes something like this. It is a very striking thought, and must certainly contain considerable truth. |
20265 | The desire for a complete system requires making the weak parts look equal to the rest [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is playacting going on among systematisers: inasmuch as they want to make the system whole and round off the horizon around it, they must attempt to have their weaker qualities appear in the same style as their strong ones. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 318) | |
A reaction: Filed under 'rationalism', because they are the notorious system builders, but the same tendency and problem can be seen to some extent among empiricsts who seek completeness. David Lewis, perhaps. |
8014 | Resolve a complex into simple elements, then reconstruct the complex by using them [Hobbes, by MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Hobbes took his method from Galileo, of resolving any complex situation into its logically primitive, simple elements and then using the simple elements to show how the complex situation could be reconstructed. | |
From: report of Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.10 | |
A reaction: Reverse engineering of reality. This idea, wherever it comes from, strikes me as the key to the advance of human understanding. No one has yet improved on it as a method, in science or philosophy. Reconstruction needs the mechanism. |
20380 | Why should truth be omnipotent? It is enough that it is very powerful [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I have no idea why the dictatorship and omnipotence of truth would be desirable; it's sufficient for me that it has great power. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], §507) | |
A reaction: I once heard a philosopher (at Essex University) assert that truth is the only value, which was interesting. Nietzsche actually wants to endorse the value of lies and deceptions, like the 'noble lie' in Plato's Republic. |
20235 | Like animals, we seek truth because we want safety [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Even that nose for truth, which is, at bottom, the nose for safety, human beings have in common with animals. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 026) | |
A reaction: After Darwin, Nietzsche immediately saw that we need an account of humanity which is continuous with animals. The first step to physical security is ascertaining the physical facts. This idea rings true. |
7559 | Every part of the universe is body, and non-body is not part of it [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: The world is corporeal, that is to say, body...and every part of the universe is body, and that which is not body is no part of the universe. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], IV.46) | |
A reaction: [Hobbes concedes existence to visible spirits, but not invisible ones]. This is the kind of remark which got Hobbes hated. It is also the sort of thing that makes him the best candidate for the 'first modern man'. |
20258 | Most people treat knowledge as a private possession [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Most people take a thing they know under their protection, as if knowing it turned it into their possession. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 285) | |
A reaction: A typically wicked and subtle remark. This presumably makes knowledge part of the will to power, with which Francis Bacon would presumably agree. |
2356 | Appearance and reality can be separated by mirrors and echoes [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: If colours or sounds were in the bodies or objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by glasses, and in echoes by reflection, we see they are; where we know the thing we see is in one place, the appearance in another. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.01) |
20250 | We may be unable to remember, but we may never actually forget [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It has yet to be proven that there is such a thing as forgetting; all we know is that the act of remembering is not within our power. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 126) | |
A reaction: There is some evidence for this. We forget innumerable people, but then find that we recognise them if we meet them many years later. Anecdotes report very ancient memories suddenly surfacing. |
2357 | Dreams must be false because they seem absurd, but dreams don't see waking as absurd [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Because waking I often observe the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdity of my waking thoughts, I am well satisfied that, being awake, I know I dream not, though when I dream I think myself awake. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.02) |
20270 | There is no one scientific method; we must try many approaches, and many emotions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is no one and only scientific method that leads to knowledge. We must proceed experimentally with things, be sometimes angry, sometimes affectionate towards them, and allow justice, passion, and coldness to follow one upon another. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 432) | |
A reaction: Alexander Bird says the same thing in our time. I agree, but I think there is a core of controlled conditions and peer review. |
20131 | We can cultivate our drives, of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity, like a gardener, with good or bad taste [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One can dispose of one's drives like a gardener and, though few know it, cultivate the shoots of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity as productively and profitably as a beautiful fruit tree on a trellis; one can do it with the good or bad taste of a gardener. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 560) | |
A reaction: This sort of existentialism I find very appealing. You take what you are given, the cards you are dealt, and try to make something nice out of it. This is quite different from the crazy freedom of later existentialists. |
20242 | Things are the boundaries of humanity, so all things must be known, for self-knowledge [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Only when the human being has finally attained knowledge of all things will he have known himself. For things are merely the boundaries of the human being. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 048) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather externalist view of the mind. If philosophy aims to disentangle mind from world then good knowledge of the world seems to be required. |
20249 | Our knowledge of the many drives that constitute us is hopelessly incomplete [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: No matter how hard a person struggles for self-knowledge, nothing can be more incomplete than the image of all the drives taken together than constitute his being. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 119) | |
A reaction: This gives the concept of personal identity that arises from the (later) doctrine of the 'will to power'. It is a bundle view of the self, but a bundle of drives rather than of percepts and mental events. His view is close to Hume's. |
2358 | Freedom is absence of opposition to action; the idea of 'free will' is absurd [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: If a man should talk to me of a 'free-will', or any 'free' but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say that he were in an error, but that his words were without a meaning, that is to say, absurd. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.05) |
20231 | People used to think that outcomes were from God, rather than consequences of acts [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: People used to believe that the outcome of an action was not a consequence, but an independent, supplemental ingredient, namely God's. Is a greater confusion conceivable? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 012) | |
A reaction: Not sure how well documented or accurate this is, but Nietzsche was a great scholar, and it would explain the fatalism that runs through many older forms of society. |
6214 | Liberty and necessity are consistent, as when water freely flows, by necessity [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Liberty and necessity are consistent: as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], II.Ch.XI) | |
A reaction: Hume asserts something similar (Idea 2223), but they both miss the point, which is that libertarians about water would have to believe it didn't need to follow gravity, but could refuse to flow. Freedom of will and freedom of action are quite different. |
23987 | The 'simple passions' are appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief [Hobbes, by Goldie] |
Full Idea: For Hobbes the 'simple passions' were appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief. | |
From: report of Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], I.6) by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 4 'Evidence' | |
A reaction: This is the standard approach to emotions of Hobbes's time. Modern thinkers probably reject the idea that passions can be simple or basic. Rightly, I think. |
20266 | It is essential that wise people learn to express their wisdom, possibly even as foolishness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is not yet enough to prove a thing, one must seduce people to accept it or raise them up to it. That is why a knowledgeable person ought to learn to speak his wisdom: and often in such a way that it sounds like foolishness. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 330) | |
A reaction: Kant comes to mind. He has needed endless exegesis by people who write better than him. Have there been even greater philosophers who couldn't express their wisdom at all? Cratylus, perhaps! |
2362 | The will is just the last appetite before action [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: In deliberation, the last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the Will. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.06) | |
A reaction: I share his caution about 'the will', but his observation strikes me as inaccurate. When I drink, my 'will' is not my thirst. I take the will to be a feature of my reason. I gave my thirst permission to indulge itself. The will is practical reason? |
2363 | Reason is usually general, but deliberation is of particulars [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Reasoning is in general words, but deliberation for the most part is of particulars. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.06) |
20251 | Actions done for a purpose are least understood, because we complacently think it's obvious [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Of all actions, the ones least understood are those undertaken for a purpose, no doubt because they have always passed for the most intelligible and are to our way of thinking the most commonplace. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 127) | |
A reaction: You feel that Nietzsche is right about our stupendous lack of of self-knowledge, but then a bit of a panic ensues, because it is not clear what you are supposed to do about anything, particularly if we don't know why anyone else does anything. |
20271 | Beauty in art is the imitation of happiness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: By beauty in art one always understands imitation of happiness. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 433) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how one goes about imitating happiness. One can replicate things that make us happy, like a nice landscape. But some beauty in art is also novel, and produces a new sort of happiness. Kandinsky. |
20230 | The very idea of a critique of morality is regarded as immoral! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Even to think of criticising morality, to consider morality as a problem, as problematic: what? was that not - is that not - immoral? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], Pref 3) | |
A reaction: Offering critiques of the value of morality and of truth are perhaps Nietzsche's greatest achievements. |
20234 | Morality prevents us from developing better customs [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Morality acts to prevent the rise of new and better mores: it stupefies. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 019) | |
A reaction: Note that he wants 'better' customs, and not just different ones. So the deep question concerns the criteria for why some customs are better. He seems to want us to fulfil our natures more completely. Arts, sciences, great deeds... |
20237 | Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The history of moral feeling is completely different from the history of moral concepts. The former are powerful before, the latter especially after an action in view of the compulsion to pronounce upon it. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 034) | |
A reaction: I think he places the feelings in our animal origins, and the concepts in rather unnatural cultures. |
20238 | Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To trust your feelings - that means obeying your grandfather and your grandmother and their grandparents more than the gods in us: our reason and our experience. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 035) | |
A reaction: He says prior to this that feelings are just an inheritance, not our true natures. Stoics said 'live according to nature', by which they meant 'live by reason', because that is our true nature. |
2360 | 'Good' is just what we desire, and 'Evil' what we hate [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth 'Good'; and the object of his hate or aversion 'Evil'. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.06) | |
A reaction: This meets the Frege-Geach Problem - that we can have these feelings while reading ancient history, but we can't possibly 'desire' any of that. This is better on evil than on good. |
2368 | Men's natural desires are no sin, and neither are their actions, until law makes it so [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: The desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.13) | |
A reaction: That is a pretty flat rejection of natural law, as you might expect from an empiricist. So prior to the first law-making, no one ever did anything wrong? Hm. |
20243 | Human beings are not majestic, either through divine origins, or through grand aims [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Formerly one tried to get a feel for the majesty of human beings by pointing backward toward their divine descent: this has now become a forbidden path. ...So now the path humanity pursues is proof of its majesty. Alas, this too leads nowhere! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 049) | |
A reaction: I love the breadth of Nietzsche's vision, both across history, and in the great scheme. He goes on to say that we are no more a 'higher order' than ants and earwigs. |
20268 | Most dying people have probably lost more important things than what they are about to lose [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The act of dying is not as significant as the universal awe of it would have us believe, and the dying person has probably lost more important things in life than he is now about to lose. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 349) | |
A reaction: He says this is a thought about death which we tend to repress. It would depend on the life, I should think, but it is probably right in very many cases. |
2359 | Desire and love are the same, but in the desire the object is absent, and in love it is present [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Desire and love are the same thing, save that by desire we always signify the absence of the object, by love most commonly the presence of the same. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.06) | |
A reaction: Implausible reductivism from Hobbes. Plenty of counterexamples to this. You work it out! |
20236 | Marriage upholds the idea that love, though a passion, can endure [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The institution of marriage stubbornly upholds the belief that love, though a passion, is, as such, capable of duration. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 027) | |
A reaction: No wonder Nietzsche never married. Women must have been terrified of him, when he came out with this sort of remark. I doubt whether many couples who are celebrating their golden wedding would agree with him. [1/5/2017] |
20252 | Marriage is too serious to be permitted for people in love! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Lovers' vows ought to be publicly declared invalid and marriage denied the pair: and indeed precisely because one ought to take marriage unspeakably more seriously! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 151) | |
A reaction: Sounds like the traditional aristocratic attitude to marriage, so the idea suits Nietzsche. I think that nowadays it is much wiser to be base proposal of marriage on friendship than on love. You are choosing a life-long friend, not someone to adore. |
20263 | Fear reveals the natures of other people much more clearly than love does [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Fear has furthered the universal knowledge of humanity more than love, for fear wants to discern who the other person is, what he can do and what he wants. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 309) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche had it in for love at this stage in his career. This remark strikes me as brilliantly accurate. |
2370 | All voluntary acts aim at some good for the doer [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.14) | |
A reaction: Nonsense. You can only describe sacrificial acts for loved ones, such as children, in this way if this proposal is a tautology. Hobbes cannot know the truth of this claim. |
20233 | Punishment has distorted the pure innocence of the contingency of outcomes [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: With this infamous art of interpreting the concept of punishment, people have robbed of its innocence the whole, pure contingency of events. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 013) | |
A reaction: What a wonderfully subtle observation about moral luck! That whole problem is driven by the issue of whether the agent should be punished. When a chain of errors leads to disaster, we may see many innocent people doing a collective evil. |
20248 | People do nothing for their real ego, but only for a phantom ego created by other people [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Whatever they say about their 'egotism', people nevertheless do nothing their whole life long for their ego, but instead for the phantom ego that has formed in the heads around them and been communicated to them. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 105) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche has a vision of true devotion to the ego as healthy, and so (I would say) does Aristotle, though the two might disagree about the details. I want to live among people who work on themselves, not those who always sacrifice themselves. |
2371 | A contract is a mutual transfer of rights [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: The mutual transferring of right is that which men call 'contract'. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.14) |
2372 | The person who performs first in a contract is said to 'merit' the return, and is owed it [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: He that performeth first in the case of a contract, is said to 'merit' that which he is to receive by the performance of the other, and he hath it as due. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.14) |
8015 | Hobbes wants a contract to found morality, but shared values are needed to make a contract [MacIntyre on Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Hobbes makes two incompatible demands of the original contract: he wishes it to be the foundation of all shared and common standards and rules; but he also wishes it to be a contract, which needs prior shared and common standards. | |
From: comment on Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], Pt 1) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.10 | |
A reaction: At the very least, the participants in a contract must be committed to keeping it even when it is not convenient. But a common purpose seems to be needed too, which makes the contract itself intrinsically valuable. Similar objections to Kant. |
5337 | For Hobbes the Golden Rule concerns not doing things, whereas Jesus encourages active love [Hobbes, by Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Hobbes put the Golden Rule as 'do NOT do to others what you would NOT want done to yourself'. Jesus's formulation encouraged active love. Most Westerners conceive their moral duty as not to do harm, rather than actively doing good. | |
From: report of Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651]) by Owen Flanagan - The Problem of the Soul p.20n | |
A reaction: This idea probably runs very deep into western culture, where most people feel that they are being very morally good when they are sitting at home and not actually annoying anyone. Utilitarianism also offers a challenge to such complacency. |
20246 | If you feel to others as they feel to themselves, you must hate a self-hater [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Supposing we felt toward someone else as that person feels about himself, then we would have to hate him if he (like Pascal) found himself hateful. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 063) | |
A reaction: And how does the Golden Rule work if the other people feel suicidal (as groups sometimes do)? |
2374 | In the violent state of nature, the merest suspicion is enough to justify breaking a contract [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: If a covenant is made with neither party performing presently, but trust one another, in the condition of mere nature (which is war between men) upon reasonable suspicion, it is void. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.14) |
2375 | Suspicion will not destroy a contract, if there is a common power to enforce it [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: If there be a common power set over both parties in a contract, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, a contract does not become void as soon as the parties are suspicious. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.14) |
8016 | Fear of sanctions is the only motive for acceptance of authority that Hobbes can think of [MacIntyre on Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Hobbes has such a limited view of human motives that he cannot provide any other explanation for the acceptance of authority than the fear of sanctions.. | |
From: comment on Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], Pt 1) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.10 | |
A reaction: There are two alternative views - the conservative view that people naturally welcome and even need authority, because they need to be led; or the Aristotelian view that people are naturally communal, and authority is part of community life. |
2377 | No one who admitted to not keeping contracts could ever be accepted as a citizen [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: He therefore that breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.15) |
2379 | If there is a good reason for breaking a contract, the same reason should have stopped the making of it [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: If any fault of man be sufficient to discharge our covenant made, the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindered the making of it. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.15) |
2373 | The first performer in a contract is handing himself over to an enemy [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: He which performeth first in a contract, does but betray himself to his enemy. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.14) |
2382 | Someone who keeps all his contracts when others are breaking them is making himself a prey to others [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: He that should be modest and tractable, and perform all the promises, in such time and place where no man else should do so, should but make himself a prey to others. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.15) |
2383 | Virtues are a means to peaceful, sociable and comfortable living [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: The writers of moral philosophy, though they acknowledge the same virtues and vices, yet not seeing wherein consisted their goodness, nor that they come to be praised as the means of peaceable, sociable and comfortable living. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.15) |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
20240 | The Jews treated great anger as holy, and were in awe of those who expressed it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The Jews felt differently about wrath than we do and decreed it holy; in return, they, as a people, viewed the foreboding majesty of the individual with whom wrath showed itself connected, at a height at which a European is incapable of imagining. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 038) | |
A reaction: If you thought wrath was really wonderful then presumably you would aspire to partake of it, but I see no signs of the Jews having been an especially wrathful people. It sounds like the tantrums of Tudor monarchs, which was their royal privilege. |
20244 | Christianity replaces rational philosophical virtues with great passions focused on God [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Christianity disallows all moral value to the virtue of philosophers - the triumph of reason over affects - and demands that affects reveal themselves in splendour, as love of God, fear before God, fanatical faith in God, and blindest hope in God. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 058) | |
A reaction: Faith, hope and charity are the three great Christian virtues that were added to the four cardinal virtues of the Greeks. |
20272 | Honesty is a new young virtue, and we can promote it, or not [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Among neither the Socratic nor the Christian virtues does honesty appear: it is one of the youngest virtues, still quite immature. ...We can advance it or retard it, as we see fit. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 456) | |
A reaction: I associate the virtue of honesty with the cult of sincerity of feelings which arose in the romantic movement. |
20274 | The cardinal virtues want us to be honest, brave, magnanimous and polite [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Honest towards ourselves and whatever else is our friend; courageous toward the enemy; magnanimous toward the defeated; polite - always. This is how the four cardinal virtues want us to be. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 556) | |
A reaction: I take this to be Nietzsche genuinely asserting his four cardinal virtues, rather than being ironic. He certainly asserts politeness as the fourth virtue earlier in the book. Cf a different list in Idea 20382 |
2376 | Injustice is the failure to keep a contract, and justice is the constant will to give what is owed [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: The definition of 'injustice' is no other than the not performance of covenant….. and 'justice' is the constant will of giving to every man his own. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.15) |
20257 | Cool courage and feverish bravery have one name, but are two very different virtues [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Courage as cold bravery and imperturbability, and courage as feverish, half-blind bravura - one calls both of these things by the same name! How different are the cold virtues from the warm ones! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 277) | |
A reaction: How few philosophers are capable of making a subtle but accurate observation like this! How many other virtues should be subdivided? |
20259 | Teach youth to respect people who differ with them, not people who agree with them [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The surest way to ruin a youth is by teaching him to respect those who think like him more highly than those who think differently. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 297) | |
A reaction: On the whole I prefer to read the philosophers who seem to be on my side, because I am trying to strengthen my explanation of the world, and opponents aren't much help. I do read opponents, if they explicitly challenge what I defend. |
20267 | Seeing duty as a burden makes it a bit cruel, and it can thus never become a habit [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To require that duty always be somewhat burdensome - as Kant does - amounts to acquiring that it never become habit and custom: in this requirement there linger a tiny remnant of ascetic cruelty. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 339) | |
A reaction: Habit, of course, is the ideal of Aristotelian virtue. |
20275 | Most people think they are already complete, but we can cultivate ourselves [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We are free to handle and cultivate our drives like a gardener ...but how many people know we are free to do this? Don't most people believe in themselves as completed, full grown up facts? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 560) | |
A reaction: I see Nietzsche as an existentialist philosopher. He is much more than that, but this quotation endorses what I take to be the central idea of existentialism. |
19764 | Hobbes attributed to savages the passions which arise in a law-bound society [Hobbes, by Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Hobbes had wrongly injected into the savage man's concern for self-preservation the need to satisfy a multitude of passions which are the product of society and which have made laws necessary. | |
From: report of Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651]) by Jean-Jacques Rousseau - Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Part I | |
A reaction: Hobbes's famous remark concerns a state of war, which is quite a sophisticated state of conflict between well formed social groups. Rousseau's savage is fairly solitary, so won't be involved in war. |
2367 | In time of war the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: In a time of war…. there is continual fear, and danger of violent death, and the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.13) |
20566 | Hobbes says the people voluntarily give up their sovereignty, in a contract with a ruler [Hobbes, by Oksala] |
Full Idea: While Hobbes had held that the people were the final source of political authority, he had argued that in entering the social contract they gave up their sovereignty by transferring all power to an absolute ruler. | |
From: report of Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651]) by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.5 | |
A reaction: Later the idea of 'inalienable' rights crept in. If you volunteer for exploitation or slavery, that still doesn't justify them. Sadism is presumably not justified by masochism. |
20229 | No authority ever willingly accepts criticism [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: As long as the world has existed, no authority has ever willingly permitted itself to become the object of critique. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], Pref 3) | |
A reaction: A political remark, but it leads into speaking of conventional morality as just such an authority. Nowadays teachers have feedback forms, and leaders have to endure party conferences. But on the whole it remains true. |
20254 | People govern for the pleasure of it, or just to avoid being governed [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Some govern out of pleasure in governing, others in order not to be governed - to the latter, governing is merely the lesser of two evils. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 181) | |
A reaction: Our current society is full of self-employed people whose major motivation is to avoid being employees. |
20273 | The French Revolution gave trusting Europe the false delusion of instant recovery [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The 'Great Revolution' [in France] was nothing more than a pathetic and bloody quackery, which understood how, through sudden crises, to supply a trusting Europe with the sudden hope of recovery. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 534) | |
A reaction: Whenever a new leader comes into power there is the same honeymoon period, where dreams of salvation have a moment in the sun. |
2366 | There is not enough difference between people for one to claim more benefit than another [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: The difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.13) |
20485 | Hobbes says people are roughly equal; Locke says there is no right to impose inequality [Hobbes, by Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Hobbes's principle of equality was a claim about the mental and physical capabilities of all people. For Locke it is a moral claim about rights: no person has a natural right to subordinate any other. | |
From: report of Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 1 'Locke' | |
A reaction: There are obvious questions to ask about the claim that people are naturally equal. For the second one, does the lion have a natural right to subordinate the gazelle? Who cares! I'm inclined to be consequentialist about equality. |
2369 | If we seek peace and defend ourselves, we must compromise on our rights [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: From the first law of nature (that we seek peace, but also defend ourselves) comes the second: that a man be willing to lay down his rights to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.14) |
20484 | We should obey the laws of nature, provided other people are also obeying them [Hobbes, by Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Hobbes's position is that we have a duty to obey the Laws of Nature when others around us are known (or can reasonably be expected) to be obeying them too, and so our compliance will not be exploited. | |
From: report of Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 1 'Hobbes' | |
A reaction: In particular, we should keep contracts. Hobbes doesn't seem fully committed to keeping facts and values separate. |
7573 | The legal positivism of Hobbes said law is just formal or procedural [Hobbes, by Jolley] |
Full Idea: Hobbes was one of the first to propose the view known as 'legal positivism' - that the criterion for deciding whether a rule is a genuine law is entirely formal or procedural | |
From: report of Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Ch.7 | |
A reaction: This was opposed to the tradition of natural law, deriving from Aquinas. It is part of a picture of values draining out of the world as science comes to dominate. The is/ought distinction is its culmination. Power replaces virtue, and Thrasymachus wins. |
20232 | Get rid of the idea of punishment! It is a noxious weed! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: People of diligence and goodwill, lend a hand in the one work of eradicating from the face of the earth the concept of punishment, which has overrun the whole world! There is no more noxious weed! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 013) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche never tried his hand at school teaching or parenting or running a youth club. But I still love this idea. In really good families I suspect that punishment is almost unknown. |
2380 | Punishment should only be for reform or deterrence [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: We are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.15) |
20253 | Modern wars arise from the study of history [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The great wars of our day are the effects of the study of history. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 180) | |
A reaction: The Prussians reacted to Napoleon. The Nazis reacted to Versailles. But now the study of history reveals to us dreadful wars based on simplistic accounts of history. Be wise about history, not ignorant of it. |
2361 | If fear of unknown powers is legal it is religion, if it is illegal it is superstition [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind or imagined from tales publicly allowed, is religion; not allowed, is superstition. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.06) |
20261 | History does not concern what really happened, but supposed events, which have all the influence [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The writer of history deals not with what really happened but merely with supposed events, for only the latter have had an effect. ...All historians speak of things that have never existed except in imagination. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 307) | |
A reaction: This seems blatantly true, and is most obvious in the case of forged documents which have been hugely influential. Erroneous conspiracy theories are another example. (Note: only scorn conspiracy theories if you think conspiracies never happen!). |
2364 | Causation is only observation of similar events following each other, with nothing visible in between [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: In knowing the meaning of 'causing', men can only observe and remember what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent event any dependence or connexion at all. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.12) |
20241 | Enquirers think finding our origin is salvation, but it turns out to be dull [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Investigators of knowledge ...have regularly presupposed that the salvation of humanity depended on insight into the origin of things. ...but with insight into origin comes the increasing insignificance of origin. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 044) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the etymological fallacy, of thinking that the origin of a word gives you a true grasp of its meaning. |
20245 | Christianity hoped for a short cut to perfection, that skipped the hard labour of morality [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: You can say what you like: Christianity wanted to liberate humanity from the burden of the demands of morality by pointing out a shorter way to perfection, or so it believed. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 059) | |
A reaction: This conjures up Graham Greene's Catholic heroes, who wallow in sin, but hope for salvation at the last moment. |
20247 | Christianity was successful because of its heathen rituals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Not what is Christian in it, rather the universal heathenism of its rituals is the reason for the propagation of this world religion. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 070) | |
A reaction: I'm afraid I think this is right. I grew up bewildered by the lack of content in the rituals of church services. Even austere protestants manage to sing and recite. Maybe philosophies should do this - wanted: new Cartesian and Kantian rituals! |
2365 | Religion is built on ignorance and misinterpretation of what is unknown or frightening [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: In these four things - opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of religion. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.12) |
20269 | 'I believe because it is absurd' - but how about 'I believe because I am absurd' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Many people have achieved the humility that says: 'I believe because it is absurd', and have sacrificed their reason for it. But no one, as far as I know, has achieved the humility, which is only one step further, of 'I believe because I am absurd'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 417) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche gives the Latin: 'credo quia absurdum est' (Tertullian), and 'credo quia absurdus sum'. It may look like an insulting remark from Nietzsche, but it is actually in tune with the spirit of the original. |
2378 | Belief in an afterlife is based on poorly founded gossip [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Knowledge of man's estate after death, and its rewards, is a belief grounded upon other men's sayings that they knew it supernaturally, or they knew those, that knew those, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.15) |
20264 | The easy and graceful aspects of a person are called 'soul', and inner awkwardness is called 'soulless' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The sum of inner movements that are easy for a person and that he consequently performs happily and with grace is called his 'soul'; - if inner movements obviously cause him difficulty and effort, he is considered soulless. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 311) | |
A reaction: 'Soulless' is usually applied to people deficient in some sort of empathic feeling, or with an inability to recognise grandeur. It seems to imply that people who experience inner torture are soulless, but romantics see them as very soulful. |