Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Nature of Judgement' and 'The Theory of Knowledge'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

9 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings

6405	Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
	Full Idea: The rejection of idealism by Moore and Russell was marked in 1898 by the publication of Moore's article 'The Nature of Judgement'.
	From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
	A reaction: This now looks like a huge landmark in the history of British philosophy.

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis

7527	Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
	Full Idea: For Moore and Russell analysis is not - as is commonly understood now - a linguistic activity, but an ontological one. To analyse a proposition is not to investigate language, but to carve up the world so that it begins to make some sort of sense.
	From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4
	A reaction: A thought dear to my heart. The twentieth century got horribly side-tracked into thinking that ontology was an entirely linguistic problem. I suggest that physicists analyse physical reality, and philosophers analyse abstract reality.

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives

23476	Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell]
	Full Idea: 'Logical constants', which might seem to be entities occurring in logical propositions, are really concerned with pure form, and are not actually constituents of the propositions in the verbal expressions of which their names occur.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX)
	A reaction: This seems to entirely deny the existence of logical constants, and yet he says that they are named. Russell was obviously under pressure here from Wittgenstein.

23477	We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell]
	Full Idea: Such words as or, not, all, some, plainly involve logical notions; since we use these intelligently, we must be acquainted with the logical objects involved. But their isolation is difficult, and I do not know what the logical objects really are.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX)
	A reaction: See Idea 23476, from the previous page. Russell is struggling. Wittgenstein was telling him that the constants are rules (shown in truth tables), rather than objects.

5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth

18273	Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell]
	Full Idea: A touchstone by which logical propositions may be distinguished from all others is that they result from a process of generalisation which has been carried to its utmost limits.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], p.129), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 'What'

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts

22315	There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell]
	Full Idea: On Russell's pre-war conception it is obvious that a complex cannot be negative. If a complex were true, what would make it false would be its non-existence, not the existence of some other complex.
	From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 41 'Neg'
	A reaction: It might be false because it doesn't exist, but also 'made' false by a rival complex (such as Desdemona loving Othello).

19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions

22302	Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
	Full Idea: Moore avoided the problematic correspondence between propositions and reality by identifying the former with the latter; the world consists of true propositions, and there is no difference between a true proposition and the fact that makes it true.
	From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 28 'Refut'
	A reaction: This is "the most platonic system of modern times", he wrote (letter 14.8.1898). He then added platonist ethics. This is a pernicious and absurd doctrine. The obvious problem is that false propositions can be indistinguishable, but differ in ontology.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions

7526	Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
	Full Idea: Moore rejected the Hegelian view, that a proposition is a unity that defies analysis; instead, it is a complex that positively cries out to be broken up into its constituent parts, which parts Moore called 'concepts'.
	From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4
	A reaction: Russell was much influenced by this idea, though it may be found in Frege. Anglophone philosophers tend to side instantly with Moore, but the Hegel view must be pondered. An idea comes to us in a unified flash, before it is articulated.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').