Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Some Judgements of Perception' and 'Moral Luck'

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4 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE]
     Full Idea: This really is a finger ...and you all know it. ...I can safely challenge anyone to give an argument that it is not true, which does not rest upon some premise which is less certain than is the proposition which it is designed to attack.
     From: G.E. Moore (Some Judgements of Perception [1922], p.228), quoted by John Kekes - The Human Condition 01.3
     A reaction: [In Moore's 'Philosophical Studies'] This is a particularly clear statement from Moore of his famous claim. I'm not sure what to make of an attempt to compare a sceptical argument (dreams, demons) with the sight of a finger.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel]
     Full Idea: Our beliefs are always due to factors outside of our control.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Moral Luck [1976], p.27)
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel]
     Full Idea: Moral luck involves one's character, the antecedent circumstances of the act, the actual circumstances of the act, and the outcome of the act.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Moral Luck [1976], p.28)
     A reaction: Meaning, I take it, that there can be luck in any one of those four. A neat slicing up that doesn't quite fit the real world, where things flow. Helpful, though.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').