Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Can there be Vague Objects?' and 'Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory'

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10 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
16129 Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Evans tries to derive a contradiction from the supposition that a given identity statement is of indeterminate truth-value. (As it happens, I consider that this argument is flawed)
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 1.3
     A reaction: A priori, I wouldn't expect to be able to settle the question of whether there are any vague objects simply by following some logical derivation. Empirical examination, and conceptual analysis (or stipulation) have to be involved.
16459 Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
     Full Idea: Maybe the world is vague, and vagueness is a necessary feature of any true description of it. Also identities may lack a determinate truth value because of their vagueness. Hence it is a fact that some objects have fuzzy boundaries. But is this coherent?
     From: Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978])
     A reaction: [compressed] Lewis quotes this introduction to the famous short paper, to show that Evans wasn't proposing a poor argument, but offering a reductio of the view that vagueness is 'ontic', or a feature of the world.
16460 Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
     Full Idea: The correct interpretation is that Evans trusts his reader (unwisely) to take for granted that there are vague identity statements, that a proof of the contrary cannot be right, and that the vagueness-in-describing view affords a diagnosis of the fallacy.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319
     A reaction: [Lowe 199:11 is a culprit!] Lewis put this interpretation to Evans, who replied 'Yes, yes, yes!'.
16457 There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
     Full Idea: One problem with Evans's argument that there are no such thing as vague identity statements is that its conclusion is plainly false. Example: 'Princeton = Princeton Borough', where it is unsettled what region 'Princeton' denotes.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319
     A reaction: Lewis endorses the view that vagueness is semantic. I certainly don't endorse Evans's argument, which hinges on a weird example of a property, as applied to Leibniz's Law.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
10197 An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: An immanent universal will routinely be 'at some distance from itself', in the sense that it is wholly present in more than one place.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
     A reaction: This is the Aristotelian view, which sounds distinctly implausible in this formulation. Though I suppose redness is wholly present in a tomato, in the way that fourness is wholly present in the Horsemen of the Apocalypse. How many rednesses are there?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
14484 If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
     Full Idea: We cannot accept the existence of vague objects, according to Evans's argument that there cannot be indeterminacy of identity. ...From the assumption that it is indeterminate whether a = b, we conclude, determinately, that it's not the case that a = b.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by Amie L. Thomasson - Ordinary Objects 05.6
     A reaction: I think we should keep intrinsic identity separate from identity between entities. A cloud can be clearly identified, while being a bit fuzzy. It is only when you ask whether we saw the same cloud that Evans's argument seems relevant.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16224 There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG]
     Full Idea: Two things can't be vaguely identical, because then a would have an indeterminacy which b lacks (namely, being perfectly identical to b), so by Leibniz's Law they can't be identical.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978], 4.7) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: [my summary of Katherine Hawley's summary (2001:118) of Evans] Hawley considers the argument to be valid. I have grave doubts about whether b's identity with b is the sort of property needed for an application of Liebniz's Law.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
10198 If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: If nothing existed except two electrons, which are indiscernible, it remains possible that differences will emerge later. Even if this universe has eternal symmetry, such differences are still logically, metaphysically, physically and causally possible.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
     A reaction: The question then is whether the two electrons have hidden properties that make differences possible. Zimmerman assumes that 'laws' of an indeterministic kind will do the job. I doubt that. Can differences be discerned after the event?
10199 Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: Possible differences which may later become discernible could be treated as differences in a counterpart, which is similar to, but not identical with, the original object.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.307)
     A reaction: [compressed] This is a reply to Idea 10198, which implies that two things could never be indiscernible over time, because of their different possibilities. One must then decide issues about rigid designation and counterparts.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').