6715
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Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
There is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they all signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §18)
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A reaction:
The term 'red' may be assigned to a range of colours, but we also recognise the precision of 'that red'. For 'electron', or 'three', or 'straight', the particulars are indistinguishable.
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16636
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A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
To me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And to say a die is hard, extended and square is not to attribute those qualities to a distinct subject, but only an explication of the word 'die'.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], n 49)
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A reaction:
This is apparently a reaction to Locke, and a final rejection of the medieval idea of a 'substance'. Unfortunately it leaves Berkeley with a 'bundle' view of objects (a typical empiricist account), which is even worse.
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6722
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Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed - meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §3)
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A reaction:
Berkeley is always (understandably) labelled as an 'idealist', but this seems to be what we call 'phenomenalism', because it allows possible experiences as well as actual ones. See Ideas 5170 and 6522.
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6728
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Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
Is it not reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any alteration in any external object.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §14)
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A reaction:
An intriguing argument, based on what is now the principle of slow-motion photography. Fast minds slow down movement, like great tennis players. By what right does Berkeley say that the external subject is unaltered?
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6727
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Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
If heat and cold are only affections of the mind (since the same body seems cold to one hand and warm to the other), why may we not argue that figure and extension also appear different to the same eye at different stations?
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §14)
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A reaction:
If the assessment of the qualities of an object is entirely a matter of our experiences of it, there is no denying Berkeley on this. However, judgement goes beyond experience, into speculations, inferences, and explanations.
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6720
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Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
The objects of knowledge are either ideas imprinted on the senses, or passions and operations of the mind, or ideas (formed by memory and imagination) compounding, dividing or barely representing the original perceptions.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §1)
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A reaction:
This is the germ of Hume's 'associations' (Idea 2189). There is not much room here for synthetic a priori knowledge, as the a priori part seems to merely know the mind. Most of Russell's epistemology is contained in the last part of the sentence.
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6736
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I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
The knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §145)
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A reaction:
This strikes me as gross intellectual dishonesty, since the argument Berkeley uses to assert other minds could equally be used to assert the existence of tables ('by me referred to agents distinct from myself, as effects'). Be a solipsist or a realist.
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6713
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If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
If the brutes have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §11)
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A reaction:
It seems possible to imagine a low level of mind, where a few ideas (or concepts) float around, but hardly anything worth the name of reason. However, a Darwinian view suggests that concepts must bestow an advantage, so the two go together.
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6491
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Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
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Full Idea:
By Berkeley - with his anti-abstractionism and imagist theory of thought - the classical sense-datum conception was firmly established, and intentionality had disappeared as an intrinsic property, not only of perceptual states, but of all mental contents.
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From:
report of George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.6
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A reaction:
Intentionality was originally a medieval concept, and was revived by Brentano in the late nineteenth century. Nowadays intentionality is taken for granted, but I still suspect that we could drop it, and talk of nothing but brain states caused by reality.
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10581
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I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
Whether others can abstract their ideas, they best can tell. For myself, I find I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, only the idea of those particular things I have perceived, and of compounding and dividing them.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], 10)
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A reaction:
He is admitting mixing experiences, but always particulars, never abstract. His examples are 'man' and 'motion'. Compare Aristotle Idea 9067. Berkeley is, I think, trapped in a false imagistic view of thought. My image of Plato blurs young and old.
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5078
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Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Kant and Mill were in total agreement in trying to give content to the distinction between moral right and wrong, without recourse to any divine lawgiver.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.14)
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A reaction:
A nice analysis, in tune with MacIntyre and others, who see such attempts as failures. It is hard, however, to deny the claims of rational principles, or of suffering, in our moral framework. I agree with Taylor's move back to virtue, but it ain't simple.
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5067
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Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
If morality is based on wrong (meaning 'forbidden'), right ('permitted'), and obligatory ('required'), we are led to ask 'Who is it that thus permits, forbids or requires that certain things be done or not done?'
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
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A reaction:
Clear reinforcement for Nietzsche's attack on conventional morals, which Taylor sees as a relic of medieval religious attitudes. Taylor says Kant offered a non-religious version of the same authority. I agree. Back to the Greek pursuit of excellence!
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5079
|
Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Pleasures can be located in a particular part of the body, and can be momentary, and come and go, but this is not the case with happiness.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.16)
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A reaction:
Probably no one ever thought that pleasure and happiness were actually identical - merely that pleasure is the only cause and source of happiness. These are good objections to that hypothesis. Pleasure simply isn't 'the good'.
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5068
|
'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
The word 'eudaimonia' means literally 'having a good demon', which is apt, because it suggests some kind of supreme good fortune, of the sort which might be thought of as a bestowal.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
Beware of etymology. This implies that eudaimonia is almost entirely beyond a person's control, but Aristotle doesn't think that. A combination of education and effort can build on some natural gifts to create a fully successful life.
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7903
|
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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5077
|
The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12)
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A reaction:
This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings).
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5066
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If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R]
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Full Idea:
Once people are declared to be images of God, just by virtue of minimal humanity, they have, therefore, no greater individual excellence to aspire to, and their purpose became one of obligation, that is, obedience to God's will.
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From:
Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
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A reaction:
An interesting and plausible historical analysis. There is a second motivation for the change, though, in Grotius's desire to develop a more legalistic morality, focusing on actions rather than character. Taylor's point is more interesting, though.
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6731
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No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
How matter should operate on a spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore evident there can be no use of matter in natural philosophy.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §50)
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A reaction:
An intriguing argument for idealism, which starts in Cartesian dualism, but then discards the physical world because of the notorious interaction problem. Of course, if he had thought that matter and spirit were one (Spinoza) the problem vanishes.
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6730
|
We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; all this we know, not by discovering any necessary connexion between our ideas, but only by the observation of the settled laws of nature.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §31)
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A reaction:
Hume is famous for this idea, but it is found in Hobbes too (Idea 2364), and is the standard empiricist view of causation. The word 'settled' I take to imply that the laws are contingent, because they could become unsettled at any time.
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6737
|
Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
Those particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system of beings.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §153)
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A reaction:
This wildly contradicts the rest of Berkeley's philosophy, which is strictly empiricist, and rests wholly on actual experience. What experience does he have of the 'whole system of beings', and its making evil into actual good?
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