Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'New system of communication of substances' and 'Lectures on the Philosophy of (World) History'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason

21753	If we look at the world rationally, the world assumes a rational aspect [Hegel]
	Full Idea: Whoever looks at the world rationally will find that it in turn assumes a rational aspect; the two exist in a reciprocal relationship.
	From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of (World) History [1837], p.29), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
	A reaction: What happens when I look at irrationality rationally?

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason

21974	The world seems rational to those who look at it rationally [Hegel]
	Full Idea: To him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rationally back; the two exist in reciprocal relationship.
	From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of (World) History [1837], Intro p.29), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.4
	A reaction: This is a nice variation on the stoic idea that nature is essentially rational. If we are capable of rationality, then nature has made us that way. Romantics seem to prefer looking at nature less rationally, so what do they see in nature?

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence

13168	My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: To find real entities I had recourse to a unified formal atom. Hence I rehabilitated the substantial forms in a way to render them intelligible. I found that their nature consists in force, from which follows something analogous to sensation and appetite.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
	A reaction: [several lines are here compressed] This passage sums up the key to Leibniz's essentialism, which I take to be a connection between Aristotelian form and the physicists' notion of force. This gives us a modern version of Aristotelianism for science.

13169	I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Forms establish the true general principles of nature. Aristotle calls them 'first entelechies'; I call them, perhaps more intelligibly, 'primitive forces', which contain not only act or the completion of possibility, but also an original activity.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
	A reaction: As in Idea 13168, I take Leibniz to be unifying Aristotle with modern science, and offering an active view of nature in tune with modern scientific essentialism. Laws arise from primitive force, and are not imposed from without.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples

13170	The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: There are only atoms of substance, that is, real unities absolutely destitute of parts, which are the source of actions, the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and, as it were, the final elements in the analysis of substantial things.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.142)
	A reaction: I like this because it addresses the pure issue of the identity of an individuated object, but also links it with an active view of nature, and not some mere inventory of objects.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

13171	Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The nature of substance necessarily requires and essentially involves progress or change, without which it would not have the force to act.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.144)
	A reaction: Bravo. Most metaphysical musings regarding 'substance' seem entirely wrapped up in the problem of pure identity, and forget about the role of objects in activity and change.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces

13167	We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Considering 'extended mass' alone was not sufficient to explain the principles of mechanics and the laws of nature, but it is necessary to make use of the notion of 'force', which is very intelligible, despite belonging in the domain of metaphysics.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
	A reaction: We may find it surprising that force is a metaphysical concept, but that is worth pondering. It is a mysterious notion within physics. Notice the emphasis on what explains, and what is intelligible. He sees Descartes's system as too passive.