Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Notes on John Wilkins' and 'Beitrage'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Essence is the distinct thinkability of anything [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: (Essence) is the distinct thinkability (cogitabilitas) of anything.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on John Wilkins [1672], A6.2.487-8), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
     A reaction: A very original remark from the young Leibniz. It is neutral as to whether this is a real feature of objects, or a feature of human mental capacities. Presumably accidental features are thinkable, so 'distinct' is the key word.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
We form the image of a cardinal number by a double abstraction, from the elements and from their order [Cantor]
     Full Idea: We call 'cardinal number' the general concept which, by means of our active faculty of thought, arises when we make abstraction from an aggregate of its various elements, and of their order. From this double abstraction the number is an image in our mind.
     From: George Cantor (Beitrage [1915], §1), quoted by Kit Fine - Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence Intro
     A reaction: [compressed] This is the great Cantor, creator of set theory, endorsing the traditional abstractionism which Frege and his followers so despise. Fine offers a defence of it. The Frege view is platonist, because it refuses to connect numbers to the world.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').