Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'De Mundo Praesenti' and 'Reply to Foucher'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I am so much for the actual infinite that instead of admitting that nature abhors it, as is commonly said, I hold that it affects nature everywhere in order to indicate the perfections of its author.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reply to Foucher [1693], p.99)
     A reaction: I would have thought that, for Leibniz, while infinities indicate the perfections of their author, that is not the reason why they exist. God wasn't, presumably, showing off. Leibniz does not think we can actually know these infinities.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1507-8), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
     A reaction: The clearest statement of the modification of Aristotle's hylomorphism which Leibniz preferred in his middle period, and which strikes me as an improvement, and about right. Shame that monads got too much of a grip on him, but he was trying to dig deeper.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In a Being one per se a real union is required consisting not in the situation or motion of parts, as in a chain or a house, but in a unique individual principle and subject of attributes and operations, in us a soul and in a body a substantial form.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1506), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
     A reaction: Leibniz is said not to be an essentialist, by making all properties essential, but he is certainly committed to substance, and it sounds like essence here (or one view of essence), when it makes identity possible. This idea is pure Aristotle.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').