7 ideas
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: A 'nominal' definition is nothing more than an enumeration of the sufficient distinguishing characteristics. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.284) | |
| A reaction: Not wholly clear. Are these actual distinguishing characteristics, or potential ones? Could DNA be part of a human's nominal definition (for an unidentified corpse, perhaps). |
| 16740 | A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella] |
| Full Idea: A power is not the cause of an operation, but only the cause's aptitude for operating. | |
| From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], De fac anim 4:col 692), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5 | |
| A reaction: His example is the power of running, which is actually caused by the soul (or whatever), which generates the power. A power is a very superficial thing. |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283) | |
| A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent? |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: An idea is true if what it represents is possible; false if the representation contains a contradiction. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.287) | |
| A reaction: Odd in the analytic tradition to talk of a single idea or concept (rather than a proposition or utterance) as being 'true'. But there is clearly a notion of valid or legitimate or useful concepts here. Hilbert said true just meant non-contradictory. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 16571 | Prime matter is exceptionally obscure [Zabarella] |
| Full Idea: Nothing in the natural world seems to be more obscure and difficult to grasp than the prime matter of things. | |
| From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], I.1 col 133), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 2.1 | |
| A reaction: This spells the beginning of the end for 'prime matter', since a late scholastic is doubting it, even before the scientists got to work. Most modern Aristotelians slide quietly past prime matter, as unhelpful. |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283) | |
| A reaction: He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation. |