13 ideas
| 4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
| Full Idea: The Lottery Paradox says that for 100 tickets and one winner, each ticket has a .99 likelihood of defeat, so they are all likely to lose, so there is unlikely to be a winner. | |
| From: report of Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §5) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: The problem seems to be viewing each ticket in isolation. If I buy two tickets, I increase my chances of winning. |
| 5062 | First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this? [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: We rise to metaphysics by saying 'nothing takes place without a reason', then asking 'why is there something rather than nothing?, and then 'why do things exist as they do?' | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §7) | |
| A reaction: Wonderful. This is what we pay philosophers for - to attempt to go to the heart of the mystery, and then start formulating the appropriate questions. The question of 'why this?' is the sweetest question. The first one seems a little intractable. |
| 19377 | A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Each monad, together with a particular body, makes up a living substance. Thus, there is not only life everywhere, joined to limbs or organs, but there are also infinite degrees of life in the monads, some dominating more or less over others. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], 4) | |
| A reaction: Two key ideas: that each monad is linked to a body (which is presumably passive), and the infinite degrees of life in monads. Thus rocks consist of monads, but at an exceedingly low degree of life. They are stubborn and responsive. |
| 19353 | 'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: We distinguish between 'perception', the internal state of the monad representing external things, and 'apperception', which is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this internal state, not given to all souls, nor at all times to a given soul. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §4) | |
| A reaction: The word 'apperception' is standard in Kant. I find it surprising that modern analytic philosophers don't seem to use it when they write about perception. It strikes me as useful, but maybe specialists have a reason for avoiding it. |
| 4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I don't see why there shouldn't be a phenomenalist, anti-realist version of externalism, which just has 'starting points' instead of a serious commitment to foundations. |
| 4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The fundamental question that must be answered by any acceptable version of foundationalism is: how are basic beliefs possible? | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §I) | |
| A reaction: This question seems to be asking for a justification for basic beliefs, which smacks of 'Who made God?' Look, basic beliefs are just basic, right? |
| 4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The central argument for foundationalism is simply that all other possible outcomes of the regress of justifications lead inexorably to scepticism. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §I) | |
| A reaction: If you prefer coherence to foundations, you need the security of reason to assess the coherence (which seems to be an internal foundation!). |
| 4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The most extreme version of externalism would be one that held that the external condition required for justification is simply the truth of the belief in question. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §II) | |
| A reaction: The question is, why should we demand any more than this? The problem case is, traditionally, the lucky guess, but naturalist may say that these just don't occur with any regularity. We only get beliefs right because they are true. |
| 4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: External or objective reliability is not enough to offset subjective irrationality (such as unexplained clairvoyance). | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §IV) | |
| A reaction: A good argument. Where do animals fit into this? If your clairvoyance kept working, in the end you might concede that you 'knew', even though you were baffled about how you managed it. |
| 4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: It may be that where there are no positive grounds for a charge of irrationality, the acceptance of a belief with only external justification is still subjectively irrational in a sense that rules out its being epistemologically justified. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §IV) | |
| A reaction: A key objection. Surely rational behaviour requires a judgement to be made before a belief is accepted? If you are consistently clairvoyant, you must ask why. |
| 5061 | Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: There is a connexion between the perceptions of animals, which bears some resemblance to reason: but it is based only on the memory of facts or effects, and not at all on the knowledge of causes. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §5) | |
| A reaction: This amounts to the view that animals can do Humean induction (where you see regularities), but not Leibnizian induction (where you see necessities). I say all minds perceive patterns, but only humans can think about the patterns they have perceived. |
| 5063 | Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Music charms us although its beauty only consists in the harmony of numbers. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §17) | |
| A reaction: 'Only'! This is a super-pythagorean view of music, as you might expect from a great mathematician. Did he understand the horrible compromises that had just been made to achieve even-tempered tuning? Patterns are the key, as always. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |