18073
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Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher]
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Full Idea:
Dummett argues that classical logic depends on the choice of the concept of truth as central to the theory of meaning, while for the intuitionist the concept of assertability occupies this position.
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From:
report of Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 06.5
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A reaction:
Since I can assert any nonsense I choose, this presumably means 'warranted' assertability, which is tied to the concept of proof in mathematics. You can reason about falsehoods, or about uninterpreted variables. Can you 'assert' 'Fx'?
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13083
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The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Of the essence of a particular thing is what pertains to it necessarily and perpetually; of the concept of an individual thing on the other hand is what pertains to it contingently or per accidens.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Human Freedom and Divine choice [1690], Grua 383), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 3.3.1
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A reaction:
This arbitrates on the apparent conflict between his remarks in Idea 13077 and Idea 10382. There seems to be a distinction between the 'concept' of a thing, and the 'complete concept', the latter including the contingent properties.
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19056
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If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett]
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Full Idea:
If a sentence is effectively undecidable, the condition which must obtain for it to be true is not one which we are capable of recognising whenever it obtains, or of getting ourselves in a position to do so.
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From:
Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.225)
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A reaction:
The instances of 'undecidable' sentences are most clearly seen in mathematics, such as the Continuum Hypothesis or Goldbach's Conjecture, or anything involving vast infinite cardinals. But do you need precise truth-conditions for meaning?
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7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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