Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Human Freedom and Divine choice' and 'Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13083 The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Of the essence of a particular thing is what pertains to it necessarily and perpetually; of the concept of an individual thing on the other hand is what pertains to it contingently or per accidens.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Human Freedom and Divine choice [1690], Grua 383), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 3.3.1
     A reaction: This arbitrates on the apparent conflict between his remarks in Idea 13077 and Idea 10382. There seems to be a distinction between the 'concept' of a thing, and the 'complete concept', the latter including the contingent properties.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
22485 Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
     Full Idea: What all these [non-cognitivist] theories try to do is to give the conditions of use of sentences such as 'It is morally objectionable to break promises', in terms of something which must be true about the speaker.
     From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.192)
     A reaction: A wonderfully simple and accurate analysis of this view. Compare analysing 'there is a bus coming towards you' in the same way. Sounds silly, but lots of modern philosophers see things that way.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
22486 The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
     Full Idea: The mistake is to think that whatever 'grounds' for a moral judgement may have been given, someone may be unready, indeed unable, to make the moral judgement, because he has not got the attitude or feeling.
     From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.192)
     A reaction: This is roughly the Frege-Geach problem for expressivism, of how we still make moral judgements about situations where we ourselves are entirely disinterested (such as ancient historical events).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22487 Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot]
     Full Idea: The grounding of a moral argument is ultimately in facts about human life.
     From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.207)
     A reaction: The best slogan I can find for summarising Foot's metaethics. The facts she refers to the basic human needs. She is right, and this almost bridges the fact-value divide (as long as you give a damn about human needs).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').