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All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas' and 'Reflections on Value'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23881 All thought about values is philosophical, and thought about anything else is not philosophy [Weil]
     Full Idea: All reflections bearing on the notion of value and on the hierarchy of values is philosophical; all efforts of thought bearing on anything other than value are, if one examines them closely, foreign to philosophy.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Value [1941], p.30)
     A reaction: If nothing else proves that Weil is a platonist, this does. She, of course, has a transcendent and religious view of values, whereas I just see them as concepts which embody what is important. That said, I'm not far off agreeing with this.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
23885 Philosophy aims to change the soul, not to accumulate knowledge [Weil]
     Full Idea: Philosophy does not consist in accumulating knowledge, as science does, but in changing the whole soul.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Value [1941], p.33)
     A reaction: I agree, roughly. In the sense that philosophy is a much more personal matter than any pure pursuit of knowledge, such as geology. Though a life in geology could change your soul. Not just any old change, of course….
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
23886 Systems are not unique to each philosopher. The platonist tradition is old and continuous [Weil]
     Full Idea: People believe that every philosopher has a system that contradicts all the others! But there is a tradition, genuinely philosophical, that is as old as humanity itself. …Plato is the most perfect representative of this tradition.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Value [1941], p.33)
     A reaction: I see roughly two traditions. If you believe in transcendence you follow Plato, like Simone. If you are a naturalist (like me) you follow Aristotle. A third tradition might be much more sceptical.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
19426 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: A 'nominal' definition is nothing more than an enumeration of the sufficient distinguishing characteristics.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.284)
     A reaction: Not wholly clear. Are these actual distinguishing characteristics, or potential ones? Could DNA be part of a human's nominal definition (for an unidentified corpse, perhaps).
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
23884 Truth is a value of thought [Weil]
     Full Idea: Truth is a value of thought. The word 'truth' cannot have any other meaning.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Value [1941], p.32)
     A reaction: This makes a nice change from truth being a mere predicate. I would call truth the criterion of success in thought, and that counts as a value, so she is right.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19424 Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
     A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent?
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
19427 True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: An idea is true if what it represents is possible; false if the representation contains a contradiction.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.287)
     A reaction: Odd in the analytic tradition to talk of a single idea or concept (rather than a proposition or utterance) as being 'true'. But there is clearly a notion of valid or legitimate or useful concepts here. Hilbert said true just meant non-contradictory.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
23882 Ends, unlike means, cannot be defined, which is why people tend to pursue means [Weil]
     Full Idea: Everything that can be taken as an end cannot be defined. Means, such as power and money, are easily defined, and that is why people orient themselves exclusively towards the acquisition of means.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Value [1941], p.31)
     A reaction: Nice, but too neat, because so many activities can be treated either as means or as ends, and often as both. It makes sense that people pursue what is clear to them.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
23883 Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil]
     Full Idea: For the mind essentially and always, in whatever manner it is disposed, strives towards value.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Value [1941], p.31)
     A reaction: A typically platonist thought. If you accept my view that values identify what is important, the thought is plausible. We might distinguish between what the mind pointlessly entertains, and what it 'strives' for.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
19425 In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
     A reaction: He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation.