Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'De Mundo Praesenti' and 'Predest.,God's foreknowledge and contingents'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Our words and concepts don't always correspond to what is out there [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: It should not be said that as distinct words and intentions or concepts are distinct from one another, so too the corresponding things are distinct. Those distinctions do not always line up with distinctions among things that are signified.
     From: William of Ockham (Predest.,God's foreknowledge and contingents [1320], 7.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.2
     A reaction: [compressed] This is the great nominalist opponent of the idea that Aristotle's ten categories give an accurate map of reality. He proposed just substance and accidents, and based categorisation on the questions we ask.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1507-8), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
     A reaction: The clearest statement of the modification of Aristotle's hylomorphism which Leibniz preferred in his middle period, and which strikes me as an improvement, and about right. Shame that monads got too much of a grip on him, but he was trying to dig deeper.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In a Being one per se a real union is required consisting not in the situation or motion of parts, as in a chain or a house, but in a unique individual principle and subject of attributes and operations, in us a soul and in a body a substantial form.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1506), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
     A reaction: Leibniz is said not to be an essentialist, by making all properties essential, but he is certainly committed to substance, and it sounds like essence here (or one view of essence), when it makes identity possible. This idea is pure Aristotle.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').