13 ideas
23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Without a grasp of the concept of truth, not only language, but thought itself, is impossible. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.16) | |
A reaction: Davidson never mentions animals, but I like this idea because it points to importance of truth for animals as well. I say that truth is relevant to any mind that makes judgements - and quite small animals (e.g. ants and spiders) make judgements. |
23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Plato's conflation of abstract universals with entities of supreme value reinforced the confusion of truth with the most eminent truths. …The only perfect exemplar of a Form is the Form itself, …and only truth itself is completely true. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.3) | |
A reaction: Even non-subscribers to Plato often talk as if there were some grand thing called the Truth with a capital T, quite often used in a religious context. Truth is the hallmark of successful (non-fanciful) thought. |
23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Since it is neither visible as a target, nor recognisable when achieved, there is no point in calling truth a goal. We should only aim at increasing confidence in our beliefs, by collecting further evidence or checking our calculations. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], P.6) | |
A reaction: This is mainly aimed at pragmatists, but Davidson obviously subscribes (as do I) to their fallibilist view of knowledge. |
23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Correspondence, while it is empty as a definition, does capture the thought that truth depends on how the world is. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.16) | |
A reaction: Just don't try to give a precise account of the correspondence between two things (thoughts and facts) which are so utterly different in character. |
23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
Full Idea: We have to wonder how we know that it is some single concept which Tarski indicates how to define for each of a number of well-behaved languages. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], P.11) | |
A reaction: Davidson says that Tarski makes the assumption that it is a single concept, but fails to demonstrate the fact. This resembles Frege's Julius Caesar problem - of how you know whether your number definition has defined a number. |
23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Disquotation cannot pretend to give a complete account of the concept of truth, since it works only in the special case where the metalanguage contains the object language. Neither can contain their own truth predicate. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.10) | |
A reaction: Presumably more sophisticated and complete accounts would need a further account of translation between languages - which explains Quine's interest in that topic. […see this essay, p.12] |
18253 | I wish to go straight from cardinals to reals (as ratios), leaving out the rationals [Frege] |
Full Idea: You need a double transition, from cardinal numbes (Anzahlen) to the rational numbers, and from the latter to the real numbers generally. I wish to go straight from the cardinal numbers to the real numbers as ratios of quantities. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Letters to Russell [1902], 1903.05.21), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics 21 'Frege's' | |
A reaction: Note that Frege's real numbers are not quantities, but ratios of quantities. In this way the same real number can refer to lengths, masses, intensities etc. |
18166 | The loss of my Rule V seems to make foundations for arithmetic impossible [Frege] |
Full Idea: With the loss of my Rule V, not only the foundations of arithmetic, but also the sole possible foundations of arithmetic, seem to vanish. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Letters to Russell [1902], 1902.06.22) | |
A reaction: Obviously he was stressed, but did he really mean that there could be no foundation for arithmetic, suggesting that the subject might vanish into thin air? |
23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
Full Idea: If we try to provide a serious semantics for reference to facts, we discover that they melt into one; there is no telling them apart. The relevant argument (the 'Slingshot') was credited to Frege by Alonso Church. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.5) | |
A reaction: This sounds like good grounds for not attempting to be too precise. 'There are bluebells in my local wood' identifies a fact by words, but even an animal can distinguish this fact. Only a logician dreams of making its content precise. |
18269 | Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege] |
Full Idea: How are we to conceive of logical objects? My only answer is, we conceive of them as extensions of concepts or, more generally, as ranges of values of functions ...what other way is there? | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Letters to Russell [1902], 1902.07.28), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 epigr | |
A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of what Frege means by an 'object'. But an extension is a collection of things, so an object is a group treated as a unity, which is generally how we understand a 'set'. Hence Quine's ontology. |
23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It is clear that someone who knows under what conditions a sentence would be true understands that sentence, …and if someone does not know under what conditions it would be true then they do not understand it. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.13) | |
A reaction: I've always subscribed to this view. Langauge is meaningless if you can't relate it to reality, and I don't think there could be a language without an intuitive notion of truth. |
23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It may be that sentences are used as they are because of their truth conditions, and they have the truth conditions they do because of how they are used. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.13) | |
A reaction: I've always taken the attempt to explain meaning by use as absurd. It is similar to trying to explain mind in terms of function. In each case, what is the intrinsic nature of the thing, which makes that use or that function possible? |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |