Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Logic [1897]' and 'Intro to Oxford Hndbk of Metaphysics'

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3 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Modern empirical metaphysics focuses on ontological commitments of discourse, or on presuppositions [Loux/Zimmerman]
     Full Idea: The empiricist revival of metaphysics came with Quine, who focused on ontological commitments associated with accepting a body of discourse, and Strawson, asking about the presuppositions of our conceptual practices.
     From: M Loux / D Zimmerman (Intro to Oxford Hndbk of Metaphysics [2003])
     A reaction: I find myself preferring the British approach. I can discourse about things without ontological commitment, and utter truths about non-existent things. I really yearn, though, for the third way - actually reasoning towards knowing what's out there.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege]
     Full Idea: With the psychological conception of logic we lose the distinction between the grounds that justify a conviction and the causes that actually produce it.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Logic [1897] [1897])
     A reaction: Thus Frege kicked the causal theory of justification well into touch long before it had even been properly formulated. That is not to say that there is no psychological aspect to logic, because there is.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').