13941
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Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
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Full Idea:
What is it that is susceptible of truth or falsity? The answers suggested constitute a bewildering variety: sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgments, propositions, statements.
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From:
Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 01)
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A reaction:
Carwright's answer is 'statements', which seem to be the same as propositions.
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14238
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A class is an aggregate of objects; if you destroy them, you destroy the class; there is no empty class [Frege]
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Full Idea:
A class consists of objects; it is an aggregate, a collective unity, of them; if so, it must vanish when these objects vanish. If we burn down all the trees of a wood, we thereby burn down the wood. Thus there can be no empty class.
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From:
Gottlob Frege (Elucidation of some points in E.Schröder [1895], p.212), quoted by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For?
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A reaction:
This rests on Cantor's view of a set as a collection, rather than on Dedekind, which allows null and singleton sets.
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13944
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We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
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Full Idea:
We need to distinguish 1) what is asserted, 2) that assertion, 3) asserting something, 4) what is predicated, 5) what is uttered, 6) that utterance, 7) uttering something, 8) the utterance token, and 9) the meaning.
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From:
Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 05-06)
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A reaction:
[summary of his overall analysis in the paper] It is amazingly hard to offer a critical assessment of this sort of analysis, but it gives you a foot in the door for thinking about the issues with increasing clarity.
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13947
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'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
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Full Idea:
A person who utters 'It's raining' one day does not normally make the same statement as one who utters it the next. But these variations are not accompanied by corresponding changes of meaning. The words 'It's raining' retain the same meaning throughout.
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From:
Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 10)
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A reaction:
This is important, because it shows that a proposition is not just the mental shadow behind a sentence, or a mental shadow awaiting a sentence. Unlike a sentence, a proposition can (and possibly must) include its own context. Very interesting!
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13946
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To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
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Full Idea:
In order to assert that p it is not necessary to utter exactly those words. ...Clearly, also, in order to assert that p, it is not sufficient to utter the words that were actually uttered.
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From:
Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 07)
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A reaction:
I take the first point to be completely obvious (you can assert one thing with various wordings), and the second seems right after a little thought (the words could be vague, ambiguous, inaccurate, contextual)
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13951
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Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
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Full Idea:
Whereas what is asserted can be said to be accurate, exaggerated, unfounded, overdrawn, probable, improbable, plausible, true, or false, none of these can be said of the meaning of a sentence.
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From:
Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 12)
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A reaction:
That fairly firmly kicks into touch the idea that the assertion is the same as the meaning of the sentence.
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7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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